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KLAMATH FARMERS AND CAPPUCCINO 
COWBOYS1: THE RHETORIC OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND WHY IT 
(STILL) MATTERS 
MARCILYNN A. BURKE† 
 Despite what some of our critics charge, there is no grandiose plot to 
roll back safeguards or attempt an across-the-board sunset of existing 
regulations. . . . 
 The changes we are making at OMB [Office of Management and 
Budget] are not headline-grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initiatives, 
no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of regulatory re-
lief. Yet we are making some changes that we believe will have a long-
lasting impact on the regulatory state. 
- John D. Graham (2001)2 
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ABSTRACT 
 This Article traces and analyzes the negative, lasting impact of politi-
cal rhetoric on the Endangered Species Act. The discourse surrounding 
the Act is consistent in its themes, assumptions, and images, and it is se-
ductively powerful. Taking the form of stories and slogans or catch-
phrases, this rhetoric paints a picture of imbalance, pitting humans and 
their prosperity against endangered species and their protection. The po-
litical rhetoric has spurred a reform movement to solve the problems that 
the stories portray. In this way, it influences proposed legislation, regula-
tions, and day-to-day operations of the Executive Branch. Yet, the solu-
tions to these “problems” are ill-advised for several reasons. First, they 
seek to address problems that do not exist. The stories are misleading; 
important facts and contexts are omitted. Moreover, they seek to create a 
new property entitlement for a select segment of the public while at the 
same time undermining the values that undergird the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. And because much of the change occurs within the agency’s 
day-to-day routine, it escapes public scrutiny, not being subject to Con-
gressional debate or notice and comment rulemaking procedures. Thus, it 
is important to recognize the deflection of the issues, to challenge the 
rhetoric, and ultimately to develop alternative, expanded narratives that 
reflect the values of the broader public with respect to species protection. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Political rhetoric—through the use of stories and catchphrases—
frames debates and influences outcomes. It is directed towards the various 
branches of government as well as the public and is presented in various 
formats, including Congressional testimony, press releases, newspaper and 
magazine articles, and television and radio news broadcasts. Political rheto-
ric works well with what Zygmunt Plater calls “infotainment,” that is, “the 
broadcast news departments’ perceived need to be attractive and engaging 
to their desired audience by producing quick and catchy news segments.”3 
It is captivating, enduring, and powerful. Significantly, the law responds to 
political rhetoric formally through legislation and regulation as well as in-
formally through discretionary acts of the Executive Branch. 
As part of the Contract with America, many Republican members of 
Congress called for significant reform of the Endangered Species Act 
 
 3. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the 
Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L. 1, 28 (2002). 
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(“ESA” or “the Act”). Recognizing the political sway of well-told, oft-
repeated stories, those members of Congress along with private property 
rights activists called for reform on behalf of small private property owners 
who allegedly were having their rights trampled upon and their financial 
lives ruined by overzealous regulators. These “horror stories” illustrating 
the Act’s devastating consequences followed a simple, yet intuitively ap-
pealing paradigm. In a Lockean world, owners of property have the unfet-
tered right to develop their property as they see fit, perhaps limited only by 
the law of nuisance and “background principles” of the state’s property 
law.4 If the government, through the Endangered Species Act, wishes to 
take one of the sticks out of the fabled property bundle by regulating pri-
vate activity for the public’s benefit, it must compensate the private prop-
erty owners for their losses. The meta-story was that the relationship 
among species protection, private property rights, and the economy was out 
of balance and Congress needed to act to restore the proper balance. With 
this world view, the 104th Congress proposed a myriad of legislation to 
limit the impact of the ESA on private lands, including proposals to create 
a new right of compensation for private landowners whose otherwise law-
ful activities were prohibited by the Act. 
This Article focuses on the nature and persistence of this political 
rhetoric over the past decade and its negative impact upon species protec-
tion. One might argue that political rhetoric just does not matter because it 
does not represent the actual state of affairs. In law- and rule-making, ar-
guably, it would be difficult to hide one’s agenda behind anecdotes and 
slogans when the time comes for the careful process of drafting new laws 
and regulations.5 After all, no amendments to the ESA resulted from the 
Contract with America and its stories. 
 
 4. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (“Any limitation so 
severe [that is, any regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land] cannot be newly 
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”) 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not elaborated on what it means by “background principles” of 
state law. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001) (“We have no occasion to consider 
the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of prop-
erty law or whether those circumstances are present here.”). The concept has fostered several law re-
view articles, however. See, e.g., James Burling, The Latest Take on Background Principles and States’ 
Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 497 (2002); David L. Callies & J. 
David Breemer, Selected Legal & Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom, and 
Public Trust “Exceptions” and the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 
339 (2002). 
 5. Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against En-
vironmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 637, 640 (1995). 
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But this Article submits that rhetoric matters, especially in our dis-
course about the ESA. It matters for a number of reasons, but mainly be-
cause, as Margaret Radin offers, rhetoric “might lead less-than-perfect 
practitioners to wrong answers in sensitive cases.”6 And even if the myths 
are later dispelled, they leave a lasting imprint on the consciousness of the 
American public. 
The implementation of the Endangered Species Act raises sensitive 
questions and this rhetoric of reform may lead to the wrong answers. Many 
of those answers are being developed not through traditional legislative and 
regulatory processes, but through policy decisions affected by bureaucrats 
that most Americans have never even heard of. That’s right; the real action 
is happening behind the scenes—scenes painted by these “tales from the 
regulatory crypt.”7 Arguably these stories have affected decisions to list 
species as endangered or threatened, decisions to designate critical habitat, 
and decisions to defend against challenges to the Endangered Species Act 
and its regulations. 
Moreover, the rhetoric has steered the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“the Service”), the ESA’s primary implementing agency,8 toward com-
promise and to a kind of enforcement scheme that disregards the Service’s 
obligations under the Endangered Species Act. Not only has the Service not 
countered the perception that these horror stories are true, accurate, and 
representative, but it is shaping its policies as if they are in fact true, accu-
rate, and representative.9 The Service is now using “cooperative” and “col-
laborative” strategies to address the problems portrayed by the horror sto-
ries.10 These strategies may be heralded as creative efforts to involve 
stakeholders in the development of regulations that will affect them, to 
 
 6. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878 (1987). 
 7. Restoring Accountability to Government Rulemaking and H.R. 3277, ‘The Regulatory Ac-
countability Act’: Before the House Judiciary Comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 104th 
Cong. (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 8. The Secretary of the Interior, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, has responsibility for 
terrestrial and freshwater species and some marine species, while the Secretary of Commerce, through 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has 
responsibility for most marine species and most anadromous fish. And the two agencies share jurisdic-
tion over some species. 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627, 15,627-30 (Oct. 6, 1970). For simplification, when the text 
refers to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Service, or FWS, it should be read to include NFMS, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 9. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2004) (codifying the “No Surprises” Rule, which provides assur-
ances to encourage conservation of species). 
 10. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Our Endangered Species Program and How It Works With 
Landowners, at http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/landown.pdf (May 2003) (“By building strong 
partnerships and initiating early and collaborative conservation efforts, the Service can best achieve the 
purpose of the Endangered Species Act to conserve endangered and threatened species and the ecosys-
tems upon which they depend.”). 
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draw upon the stakeholders’ expertise, and to save the Act from losing all 
force. However, these strategies also raise the concern that these negotia-
tions weaken environmental standards and undermine accountability. 
The White House through the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”) and the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) also plays an 
active role in altering the implementation of the Act. “Our approach is ‘to 
maximize the quality of life for America,’ said James L. Connaughton, 
chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, ‘and that means balancing the environmental equation with the natural 
resources equation, the social equation and the economic equation.’”11 To 
achieve this balance, the Bush Administration is insisting upon the use of 
cost-benefit analyses and “sound science,” for example. These measures 
are directed towards the problems described in the horror stories as well—
problems that may not really exist. 
Holly Doremus has written about the successful use of political rheto-
ric to protect nature and the inability of this rhetoric of the past to continue 
to provide protection in a dynamic world. She explains that nature advo-
cates are unhappy now because though they have obtained what they asked 
for, they have not in fact asked for what they want.12 Thus, they need to de-
velop a broader discourse to advance nature protection beyond its current 
state.13 In contrast, this Article demonstrates that the interests seeking re-
form of the ESA may no longer be asking directly for they want, but they 
are achieving what they want. This Article expands the scope of scholar-
ship in this area to analyze not only the enduring influence of the rhetoric 
on formal legal and regulatory processes but also on discretionary acts of 
agencies. 
Part II of this Article will review the Endangered Species Act gener-
ally and more specifically will examine the sections of the Act that the po-
litical rhetoric targets. Part III will dissect the rhetoric of the legislative re-
formers as the background against which the legislative proposals 
described in Part IV are analyzed. Part IV will explain the consequences of 
the proposals and evaluate how they would affect small landowners, the 
central characters of the stories told in Part III. Part V will examine the 
counter-rhetoric against the “rollbacks” used by environmental groups and 
the Democratic Party. In Part VI, the Article will address the rhetoric of re-
form as espoused by the Executive Branch and then in Part VII analyze 
 
 11. Douglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush Sees a Balance, Critics a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 2003, at 1. 
 12. Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward A New Discourse, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 14 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 15-16. 
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how that rhetoric is actualized in the Executive Branch’s initiatives. Finally 
in Part VIII, the Article will argue that all of this rhetoric and attendant 
policies are part of an effort to secure a new entitlement for certain mem-
bers of the public. By sidestepping the statute, discounting the common 
law, and avoiding a discussion of values these reformers are attempting to 
create new rights for the select few, at the expense of listed species and the 
American public. 
Even when legislative or formal regulatory outcomes do not seem-
ingly implement major changes to the Act, the rhetoric that inspired them 
and upon which they rely makes lasting changes to the “facts on the 
ground.” And it often does so without the scrutiny of Congressional debate 
or notice and comment procedures and thus is very dangerous. If the 
American public ignores the rhetoric and its long-lasting influence, the 
public does so at its own peril. In this way, “rhetoric matters”14 today even 
more than it did before. 
II.  THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND TAKINGS 
The stated purposes of the Endangered Species Act are to “provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the 
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.”15 The Act 
provides several mechanisms through which the Secretary16 may accom-
plish these goals. The mechanisms for conservation include land acquisi-
tion,17 cooperation with states18 through management agreements19 and co-
operative agreements,20 regulation of federal agency actions,21 and the 
prohibition of certain acts on private land.22 
Though there is much debate surrounding the Endangered Species 
Act, this Article focuses only on certain aspects including: (1) Section 4’s 
requirements for listing a species and designating critical habitat; (2) Sec-
 
 14. Id. at 12. 
 15. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). 
 16. References to “the Secretary” mean the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce 
except as otherwise provided. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000). 
 17. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (2000). The 2004 request for land acquisition appropriations total $40.7 mil-
lion, a decrease of $29.6 million from 2003. H.B. 5092 Dept. of the Interior and Related Agencies Ap-
propriation Act, 2003. For land and water acquisitions, $82.25 million is to be derived from the Land 
and Water Conservation Fund and is to remain available until it is expended. Id. 
 18. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2000). 
 19. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c). 
 21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000). 
 22. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000). 
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tion 9’s prohibition of the taking of endangered species and the U.S. Con-
stitution’s Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation; and (3) Section 10’s incidental take permits 
and habitat conservation plans. In addition, the following discussion of 
Sections 6 and 7 of the Endangered Species Act will concentrate on the 
subsections that are relevant to the rhetoric and the reforms. 
A. Section 4—Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat 
Section 4(a) of the Act requires the Secretary to determine whether 
any species’ continued existence is “threatened” or “endangered.”23 The 
Secretary makes her determination of whether a species should be listed as 
threatened or endangered “solely on the basis of the best scientific and 
commercial data available.”24 Section 4(a) of the Act also requires the Sec-
retary to designate critical habitat “to the maximum extent prudent and de-
terminable,” for every listed threatened or endangered species.25 Critical 
habitat is comprised of “the specific areas within the geographical area oc-
cupied by the species at the time it is listed . . . [and] on which are found 
those physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the 
species and which may require special management consideration.”26 Be-
fore designating a particular area as critical habitat, the Secretary must first 
consider “the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of” such a 
designation.27 The D.C. Circuit Court, however, has held that the Service is 
not obligated to conduct studies to obtain missing data.28 “[T]he Service 
must utilize the best scientific . . . data available, not the best scientific data 
possible.”29 
B. Section 6—Cooperation with States 
Section 6 of the Act provides that the Secretary is to “cooperate to the 
maximum extent practicable with the States.”30 Under Section 6’s author-
ity, the Secretary may enter into management agreements “for the admini-
 
 23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2000). An endangered species is “any species which is in danger of ex-
tinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000). A threat-
ened species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable 
future . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
 24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
 28. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 215 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 29. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000). 
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stration and management of any area established for conservation” of en-
dangered or threatened species.31 Also, if a state proposes a conservation 
program and the Secretary determines that it is in accordance with the Act, 
the Secretary must enter a cooperative agreement with the state.32 Then the 
Secretary is authorized to provide financial assistance of up to 75 percent 
of the estimated cost of the program.33 
During the Clinton Administration, the Service made increasing use of 
this provision. In 1990, appropriations for programs under section 6 were 
$6,671,000, approximately 1 percent of the Services’ budget.34 In 1999, the 
amount was $23 million, approximately 3 percent of the budget.35 This 
trend has continued with the Bush Administration. For FY 2004 the De-
partment requested $121 million, approximately 13 percent of the budget.36 
This section provides the statutory basis for the Cooperative Conservation 
Initiative, discussed in Section VI.B.3 infra. 
C. Section 7—Consultation 
Section 7 of the ESA applies only to projects with some federal in-
volvement: a “federal nexus.” This section mandates that the Secretary 
work with federal agencies on “any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out” that may affect a listed species or its habitat to insure that the action 
will not “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threat-
ened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat 
of such species.”37 Also, if any person requiring a permit or license from a 
federal agency to carry out her plans “has reason to believe that an endan-
gered species or threatened species may be present in the area affected by 
the project and that implementation of such action will likely affect such 
species,” the agency also must consult/work with the Service.38 
Through the consultation process, the Service lends its expertise to the 
action agency, which must conduct a biological assessment of the project 
area.39 The Secretary must provide a “biological opinion” concerning how 
 
 31. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b). 
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c). 
 33. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(2)(i). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 101-512, 104 Stat. 1915 (1990). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). 
 36. The request included $42,929,000 from the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation 
Fund and $86,471,000 from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. H.R. 5093, Department of Interior 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003 (Report in House), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c107:1:./temp/~c107UtzaJa:e16231. 
 37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). 
 38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3). 
 39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). 
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the agency’s or applicant’s action will affect the species or its habitat.40 If 
“jeopardy or adverse modification is found,” the Secretary must suggest 
reasonable and prudent alternatives which she believes may be taken by the 
agency or applicant that would not jeopardize the continued existence of a 
listed species or adversely modify its habitat.41 
Arguably a federal nexus is of significant economic and technical 
value for an individual landowner when the requirements of section 7 are 
compared to those of section 10 of the Act for an “incidental” take.42 In-
stances in which a private entity may set in motion the section 7 process 
“remain the exception rather than the rule,”43 however. Thus, most individ-
ual landowners must fulfill the requirements of section 10 themselves if 
their planned activities are likely to harm listed species. 
D. Section 9—Takings Prohibition 
Section 9 of the Act is the main provision governing the activities of 
private entities. This section makes it unlawful for any person to “take any 
[endangered] . . . species within the United States or the territorial sea of 
the United States.”44 The statute defines “take” as “harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in 
any such conduct.”45 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Greater Oregon pitted Respondents, who described themselves as “small 
landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest prod-
ucts industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organiza-
tions that represent their interests,” against the Secretary’s regulatory inter-
pretation of the term “harm,” which included habitat modification.46 The 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Secretary’s interpretation, finding “that the 
Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he defined 
 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
 41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
 42. See, e.g., David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management 
or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 378-79 (1995) (outlining the 
differential burdens of sections 7 and 10); Donald L. Soderberg & Paul E. Larsen, Obtaining Incidental 
Take Permits Under the Endangered Species Act: The Section 7 Alternative, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 4-6 
(1991) (observing that a landowner may be able to receive a permit to take a listed species more quickly 
under the section 7 process than the section 10 process and that a landowner is more likely to receive a 
permit under section 7). 
 43. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Plan-
ning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL L. 605, 620 (1991). 
 44. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000). 
 46. 515 U.S. 687, 692 (1995). 
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‘harm’ to include ‘significant habitat modification or degradation that actu-
ally kills or injures wildlife.’”47 
E. Section 10—Incidental Take Permits and HCPs 
Section 10 of the ESA sets forth the procedures under which the Sec-
retary may grant permits to private entities to conduct activities that other-
wise would be violations of section 9 because of the incidental taking of a 
species.48 A take is incidental if it is prohibited under section 9 but “is inci-
dental to, and not the purpose of carrying out an otherwise lawful activ-
ity.”49 To receive a permit, an applicant must develop a habitat conserva-
tion plan.50 The plan must specify— 
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking; 
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such 
impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such steps; 
(iii) what alternative actions to such takings the applicant considered 
and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and 
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being neces-
sary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.51 
The Secretary may issue a permit for an incidental taking if she is sat-
isfied with the information provided in the plan and that “the taking will 
not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the 
species in the wild.”52 Moreover, the Secretary may revoke the permit if the 
permittee does not comply with permit’s terms.53 
Individual entities or groups of entities may develop habitat conserva-
tion plans (“HCPs”).54 Plans that involve significant governmental partici-
pation are often known as regional habitat conservation plans (“RHCPs”) 
and attempt to provide for large areas of land which involve many different 
interests. From the small landowner’s perspective, the requirements of an 
HCP can eviscerate any intentions to exploit the property economically. 
 
 47. Id. at 708. 
 48. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2001) for detailed provisions. 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 50. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
 53. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(C). 
 54. See J.B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered 
Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. L. 345 (1999) (explaining the 
fundamentals of HCPs). As of October 1, 2001, over 447 HCPs had been approved, addressing more 
than 516 species across more than 39 million acres. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation 
Plans Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act, at 1, at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCP_ 
Incidental_Take.pdf (2002). 
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Costs associated with the development of an HCP may include mitigation 
fees as well as paying for biological surveys and legal counsel. Although 
the Service has not compiled any data concerning the costs of developing 
an HCP,55 several sources indicate that these costs exceed the resources of 
the typical small landowner.56 One study of the RHCP for Austin, Texas 
estimated that in the absence of an RHCP, the cost of compliance with the 
ESA for landowners would be approximately $9,000 per acre in 1992 dol-
lars.57 The assessment under the RHCP was estimated to be between $600 
and $3,000 per acre.58 
The ability of landowners to join together and proportionally share the 
costs of development can mitigate the effect of the requirement, yet several 
factors may make this sharing arrangement a non-viable option. Divergent 
interests, resources, and sizes of landholdings as well as the political cli-
mate concerning conservation efforts in the area are a few of the obstacles 
to building consensus among several landowners.59 For example, the HCP 
developed to address the Stephens’ kangaroo rat in California affects ap-
proximately 80,000 acres of land and thousands of landowners.60 While it 
may be desirable to include a great number of participants to instill confi-
dence in the process and encourage cooperation in implementation, the 
 
 55. The Endangered Species Act: The Role of Habitat Conservation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
103d Cong. 41 (1993) [hereinafter The Role of Habitat Conservation Hearing] (testimony of Michael 
Spears, then Assistant Director for Ecological Services, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). 
 56. See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private 
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 382 (1994) (stating “cost may be prohibitive for small landowners not 
covered by regional or project HCPs funded by big developers or state and local governments”). 
 57. Melinda E. Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin, Texas’ 
Risky Approach to Ensuring Endangered Species’ Survival in the Texas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L. 
581, 587 n.33 (1994) (citing GEORGE W. GAU & JAMES E. JARRETT, ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY OF 
BALCONES CANYONLANDS CONSERVATION PLAN 4-15 (1992)). 
 58. Id. The costs are less per acre because of economies of scale. Rather than requiring developers 
to acquire a permit for each individual activity, the Service authorizes development in the entire area 
with one regional permit. Id. In 1994 fees ranged from $250 per acre in Clark County Nevada for the 
desert tortoise HCP to $1,950 in Riverside County California for the HCP for the Stephens’ kangaroo 
rat. The San Bruno Mountain HCP collects an annual fee of $20 per unit for residential property and 
$10 per one thousand square feet for commercial property. TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND URBAN GROWTH 38-39 (1994). 
 59. See BEATLEY, supra note 59, at 40-53 (describing the different stakeholders in the HCP proc-
ess and their perspectives with respect to their level of environmental concern, the value they place on 
endangered species, their perceived legitimacy of land regulation, their expectations for land holdings, 
and their interest in quick resolution). 
 60. The Endangered Species Act-Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. 13 (1993) [hereinafter Incentives to Encourage Conservation 
by Private Landowners] (statement of Robert D. Thornton). 
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numbers themselves bode against any one small landowner or even a group 
of small landowners having significant input in the final plan.61 Further-
more, the lengthy average time that elapses between submission of a plan 
and a response from the Secretary is a factor which may be a costly burden 
for a small landowner.62 Another difficulty for the small landowner en-
gaged in the HCP process as contrasted to the large landowner is that the 
small landowner often cannot shift her development activities to avoid the 
species’ habitat.63 
The use of the HCP expanded greatly during the tenure of Secretary 
Bruce Babbitt.64 It could be said that Babbitt perceived the rhetoric of re-
form as a omen and knew that if the agency did not take some action to 
quell the cries of the private property rights advocates, one of the compen-
sation bills presented in the 104th-106th Congresses may have passed.65 So 
he tried to balance the interests of the species and the landowners. One 
such initiative, the “no surprises” policy, is analyzed in detail infra Part 
VII.B.2.b. However, Babbitt was not without his critics arguing that HCPs 
were of limited effectiveness.66 
 
 61. MICHAEL J. BEAN, ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: 
THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE 13 (1991) (stating that “[t]wo obvious problems 
emerge . . . . One is to ensure that all those with an interest in the HCP process have an opportunity to 
participate in it and the other is to keep the process from involving so many parties as to be unmanage-
able.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 62, at 648 (explaining that “[e]ven a relatively simple single-
species conservation plan can be expected to require more than a year of processing taking into account 
NEPA’s requirements, the § 10(a) permit process, and local government processing requirements.”). 
 63. “The traditional approach of the HCPs of drawing a line on the map and identifying preserva-
tion zones and development zones works OK if you have very large landowners who are able to move 
their resource development activities around. It does not work where you have thousands of private 
landowners . . . .” Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 62, at 60 
(statement of Robert D. Thornton, attorney having represented landowners, developers, and local and 
regional agencies in the area of endangered species). See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endan-
gered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 320 (1997) (citing 
evidence that large landowners may be able to shift burdens onto smaller, less organized landowners). 
 64. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of the Interior: A Preliminary 
View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199, 213-14 (2001) (explaining that, during Babbitt’s tenure, “hundreds of millions 
of acres of public and private land . . . came directly under the ESA’s influence . . .”); J.B. Ruhl, Who 
Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 367, 382-83 (1998) (stating that, during the 1990s “hundreds of HCPs [were] approved, 
many of which encompass large planning areas that include valuable ecosystem features.”) 
 65. See Leshy, supra note 64, at 209 (“With the Republican takeover of Congress, the Administra-
tion’s natural resource legislative agenda conflated into two relatively narrow goals. The first was to 
play effective defense and damage control, fighting off unacceptable legislation in a host of ar-
eas . . . .”). 
 66. See e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institu-
tional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 71-74 (2001); 
Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships, 16 
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III.  THE RHETORIC OF LEGISLATIVE “REFORM” 
In the lengthy process of reauthorization, members of Congress, ad-
ministrations, environmentalists, business people, landowners, and others 
have proposed a number of reforms for the Endangered Species Act. Most 
environmental interest groups have focused their efforts upon improving 
the process for developing habitat conservation plans, including increased 
technical assistance to landowners.67 The focus of Congress was altogether 
different when the Republican Party took control in 1994. Before the 1994 
Congressional elections, most of the proposed amendments dealt substan-
tively with the provisions of the Act.68 During the first 100 days of the 
104th Congress and its Contract with America, however, Congress focused 
on providing compensation to private property owners if they suffered a 
specified percentage of diminution in the value of their land due to regula-
tion under the Act.69 Moreover, that Congress passed a moratorium, to en-
dure until reauthorization, on the listing of endangered or threatened spe-
cies and the designation of critical habitat.70 That moratorium has been 
lifted,71 but the Republicans’ focus on radical change persists into the new 
millennium.72 
 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 94, 95, 96 (2001); Jennifer Jester, Comment, Habitat Conservation Plans 
Under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse and the Unfulfilled Man-
date of Species Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 147-58 (1998). 
 67. See generally Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 60, at 
78; see also Endangered Species: Push on for Reform of Act During Reauthorization, MGMT. 
BRIEFING, Jan. 9, 1995 (National Wildlife Federation suggesting encouraging regional habitat conserva-
tion plans and setting up a “small landowner grant program” to help landowners prepare HCPs); En-
dangered Species Act Reauthorization Before the Subcomm. On Clean Water, Fisheries and Wildlife of 
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. 162-65 (1994), (statement of Ted R. 
Brown, President, Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress advocating that “[t]he HCP 
process must be refocused”). 
 68. See, e.g., H.R. 1490, 103d Cong., § 402 (1993); S. 1521, 103d Cong., § 402 (1993). Both of 
these bills contained basically the same amendments which addressed, inter alia, expanding the avail-
ability of consultation under section 7 of the Act, establishing an administrative appeals process, and 
providing financial incentives to private entities for habitat conservation such as “habitat reserve grants” 
 69. See, e.g., H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 191, 104th Cong., 
(1994). 
 70. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to 
Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, ch. 4, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995) 
(rescinding funds from Interior for listing species and designating critical habitat). 
 71. The omnibus appropriations act of 1996 gave the President the authority to suspend the mora-
torium, Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-34, 110 Stat. 
1321-159 to -160 (1996), and former President Bill Clinton suspended the moratorium upon signing the 
bill into law on April 26, 1996. Robert Dodge, Clinton Signs Budget Measure, Calls Bill Something We 
Can All Be Proud Of, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 27, 1996, at 3A. 
 72. For example, one recent legislative proposal would have lifted the prohibition against the tak-
ing of a listed species if the act or omission causing the take occurred on private land. Life, Liberty, and 
Property Protection Act, H.R. 5809, 107th Cong., § 3 (2002). 
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The 104th Congress emphasized in its rhetoric the plight of small 
landowners. Tales were spun of “powerful regulators running roughshod 
over landowners whose entire financial and emotional lives are closely tied 
to their land.”73 But the rhetorical effect achieved by those stories goes be-
yond the harms to those individual landowners. The question arises of not 
only whether the stories are true with respect to those individuals but also 
whether those stories are representative of this regulatory regime. One story 
may not be the common story. Moreover, small landowners and large land-
owners may have different and often conflicting priorities. For example, a 
letter to a House Committee by a self-proclaimed “private non-industrial 
(‘small landowner’) in Washington” stated that while the members of the 
Washington Farm Forestry Association “share many of the concerns of the 
industrial landowners, from whom you received testimony[,] . . . we have 
smaller holdings and different management objectives, and in Washington 
State we also own almost half the privately held forest land.”74 Apparently 
recognizing these differences, Congressman Bill Thomas once explained, 
“Small property owners have become endangered species under the ESA’s 
draconian regulation. Unfortunately, they are rarely noticed.”75 Yet even 
though the small landowners have occupied Congressional soundbites, as 
these stories are presented in this article query who is really being harmed 
and who would be benefited by the proposed reforms. 
The stories told by legislative and executive branches of government 
differ slightly and both are worthy of study. In so doing, one should not 
limit her evaluation of this rhetoric to what stories are being told and the 
truthfulness and representativeness thereof. Instead, one should also con-
sider what parts of those stories are not being told and, moreover, which 
stories are being omitted completely. 
Equally important in a critical perspective is to notice what is not in-
cluded in the ongoing streams of words and images, the stories not told, 
the images not displayed. As Burke insists, every supposed reflection of 
some facet of experience is in reality a selection, or a choice from among 
options selected to represent the idea or issue under focus. Such selec-
tions are inevitably deflections; they hide and obscure what lies outside 
the selection. Over time, one forgets (if indeed one ever realized) that the 
selection does not reflect the whole, only a chosen aspect or part of that 
whole. It is then accepted un-problematically as a valid reflection. As 
 
 73. Doremus, supra note 12, at 43. 
 74. Incentives to Encourage Conservation by Private Landowners, supra note 60, at 153. 
 75. Congressman Bill Thomas, What is the Most Compelling Environmental Issue Facing the 
World on the Brink of the Twenty-First Century: Externalization of Federal Public Policy Costs: The 
Endangered Species Act, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 171, 177 (1996). 
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Burke notes, this process is an inevitable aspect of symbol use, although 
it certainly at times may be a conscious strategy.76 
It is not uncommon for those attempting to persuade to use anecdotes 
or colorful stories to make a compelling argument, and this Article’s con-
cern about rhetoric may seem misplaced. As Michael Wolf argues about 
the significance of this rhetorical posturing in the legislature, perhaps, 
as important debates such as this one advance beyond the fifteen-second 
soundbite stage, the rhetorical posturing that accompanies bill sponsor-
ship often dissolves when votes are officially tallied. Moreover, as the 
difficult task of drafting the language required to reach a majority or, in 
the face of a veto, a supermajority, begins, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to hide controversial agendas.77 
Wolf may be correct that the rhetoric can only affect legislative outcomes 
to a small degree, but the stories that began as a part of the Contract with 
America have persisted from Congress to Congress. Indeed some of the 
stories, though largely myths, are a part of the American cultural fabric and 
appear to undergird many policy decisions time and time again. 
For example, the family farmer is often held up as the poster child for 
legislative reform.78 The plight of family farmers was used artfully as a jus-
tification for amending the estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code, otherwise known as the “death tax.”79 As one Wall Street Journal ar-
ticle explained, 
 
 76. Mark Mesiter & Phyllis M. Japp, Introduction: A Rationale for Studying Environmental 
Rhetoric and Popular Culture, in ENVIROPOP 7 (Mark Meister & Phyllis M. Japp. eds., 2002) (citing 
KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (3d ed. 1969) and KENNETH BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD 
HISTORY (2d ed. 1984)) (citation omitted). 
 77. Wolf, supra note 5. 
 78. See e.g., Harvesting Poverty: The Farmland Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, at A42 (“The 
family farm. Few institutions are more central—iconic, even—to America’s self-image. The words 
themselves conjure up Norman Rockwell and a shared national heritage that extols self-reliance and the 
conquest of the frontier. Politics tends to exploit easily romanticized icons, and the family farm has not 
been spared.”) 
 79. David Cay Johnson, IRS Data Dispute Danger to Farms, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2001, at C17 
(“‘To keep farms in the family, we are going to get rid of the death tax,’” President Bush vowed a 
month ago. He and many others have made the point repeatedly.”); Gov’t Press Release, Fed. Docu-
ment Clearing House, Conrad Burns, Senate Will Move to Repeal “Death” Tax, Burns Hopes 99-1 Vote 
Shows Serious Commitment to Family Businesses, Farms (July 11, 2000), 2000 WL 7980084 (“‘The 
death tax destroys Montana’s small businesses and family farms, costing us jobs we cannot afford to 
lose,’ Burns said. ‘In order to pay off the death tax, many families have to sell their businesses and 
farms. Folks have their incomes taxed throughout their lives only to have their estates taxed on the same 
income again after they die, which often leaves their families in the lurch.’”); Richard W. Stevenson, 
House Approves A Bill to Repeal the Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at A1 (“The [Republican 
House] leaders said they were driven in part by a desire to help owners of small businesses and family 
farms, who have long complained that the estate tax makes it costly or even impossible to pass their 
holdings along to another generation.”). 
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Invariably, proponents invoke sob stories of struggling Midwesterners 
forced to sell family farms to avoid onerous estate taxes. But last month 
the New York Times reported that nobody can find a bona fide example 
of a farm lost because of estate taxes. Neil Harl, an Iowa state economist 
and foremost specialist in this area, said he’d searched “far and wide” 
and found the demise of family farms because of the estate tax “a 
myth.”80 
And despite the many news reports that the proposed legislation 
would not have aided the mythical family farms in those stories,81 the bill 
ultimately passed, reducing the rates immediately and setting up a complete 
repeal of the tax in 2010.82 Despite the fact that family farms were not ex-
periencing these problems with estate taxes, the rhetoric led the way to the 
legislative “solution.” 
Indeed, in political discourse, the goal may be to exalt rhetoric over 
facts. In the case of environmental regulation, repeatedly these mythical 
farmers, ranchers, and miners have been woven into simple, yet appealing 
tales to justify a lack of regulation83 or deregulation.84 As a memorandum 
prepared by the Luntz Research Companies for the Republican Party and 
the Bush Administration entitled “Straight Talk” explained, “Indeed, it can 
be helpful to think of environmental (and other) issues in terms of ‘story.’ 
A compelling story, even if factually inaccurate, can be more emotionally 
compelling than a dry recitation of the truth.”85 The memo then explains 
the problem with relying too heavily upon facts: 
 
 80. Albert R. Hunt, The Trojan Horse Tax Cut, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001, at A19. 
 81. See, e.g., George Soros, Kill the Death Tax Now . . . No, Keep it Alive to Help the Needy, 
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2000, at A14 (“Supporters of repealing the estate tax say the legislation would 
save family farms and businesses and lift a terrible and unfair burden. I happen to be fortunate enough 
to be eligible for the tax benefits of this legislation, and so I wish I could convince myself to believe the 
proponents’ rhetoric. Unfortunately, it just isn’t so.”); Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 62 (“Tales of family farms and businesses broken up to pay the estate tax are 
basically rural legends; hardly any real examples have been found, despite diligent searching.”). 
 82. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
38, 69-86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 83. Another example is use of family farms to excuse moving slowly in the regulation of non-
point source pollution under the Clean Water Act. Government: Farmers Fear the EPA Future, 6 
WATER TECH. NEWS, Nov. 19, 1998 (quoting the President of the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
who explained that “[o]f all the ways government regulations impact the lives of family farmers, arbi-
trary water quality regulations will likely turn out to be the most harmful.”). 
 84. See discussion infra Part IV, noting that while cost-benefit analysis and sound science, for 
example, are required to justify new regulations under the Bush Administration, anecdotes and myths 
appear to be sufficient to justify deregulation. 
 85. Memorandum from the Luntz Research Companies, Straight Talk 132 (2002), at 
http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/LuntzResearch.Memo.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Luntz 
Memo]. 
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The facts were beside the point. Facts only become relevant when the 
public is receptive and willing to listen to them. . . . 
How do we avoid such debacles in the future? 
[I]t’s all in how you frame your argument, and the order in which you 
present your facts. Don’t allow yourself to become bogged down in mi-
nutiae when you should be presenting the big picture. You should have 
the details at hand to back you up, to be sure, but don’t be afraid to begin 
by painting in broad strokes.86 
Sometimes rhetoric may bring to light the importance of actual issues 
or elicit the emotional response required to spur needed legislative reform. 
Yet these “broad strokes” also can become problematic in policymaking for 
they can lead to misconceptions and bad decisions. As the economists 
Power and Barrett argue, misunderstandings tend “to distort public decision 
making.”87 Decisions are “grossly and irrationally misinformed” and the 
public sacrifices public goods such as clean air and water and critical habi-
tat to address an imagined or fabricated crisis.88 Below are a few examples 
of stories that may lead to unnecessary and ill-advised sacrifices. 
A. Sample Tales from the Regulatory Crypt 
Before this analysis proceeds any further, it is important to examine 
some of the “stories”. Sketched out below are some of those stories that re-
formists in Congress and private property rights activists have been telling. 
The stories, told for roughly the last decade, will likely elicit a strong reac-
tion that something is terribly wrong with the implementation of the ESA if 
it results in these kinds of “train wrecks.” As one reads these stories, con-
sider what facts the storyteller has selected and not selected. 
1. John Crawford of Klamath Basin, Tulelake, California 
John Crawford lives in a river basin in California. Almost 100 years 
ago, Mr. Crawford’s great grandfather, a World War I veteran, settled in 
the area after the federal government lured him and other veterans there 
with the promise of water from a dam to be used for irrigation of crops.89 In 
the spring of 2001, however, Crawford, a fourth generation tender of the 
land, was forced to stop planting new crops and watch his existing crops 
 
 86. Id. at 133. 
 87. THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N. BARRETT, POST-COWBOY ECONOMICS: PAY AND 
PROSPERITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN WEST 126 (2001). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Klamath River Sparks Irrigation War, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, at http://www.enn.com/news/ 
wire-stories/2001/07/07132001/ap_klamath_44232.asp?site=email (July 13, 2001). 
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turn brown.90 That was because the federal government had decided not to 
release the water from the dam for irrigation in order to keep it in the river 
for the benefit of an endangered species of fish.91 It was estimated that Mr. 
Crawford and his neighbors would lose at least $300 to $500 million that 
year.92 If the dam remained closed beyond that year, Crawford and his 
neighbors in effect would be evicted forcibly from the land that their fami-
lies had farmed for generations because the government had taken away 
their right to water. 
2. Margaret Rector of Austin, Texas 
Approximately thirty years ago, Margaret Rector purchased fifteen 
acres of land in Austin, Texas and considered it a kind of annuity.93 She 
planned to wait for the land to appreciate in value and then to sell it to pro-
vide for her retirement. In 1990, at the age of seventy, Ms. Rector was told 
by the Fish and Wildlife Service that her land was the home of a protected 
species of bird, the golden-cheeked warbler. She may be able to develop 
her land, but it will cost her tens of thousands of dollars for ecological stud-
ies and lawyers. Meanwhile, the market value of the land has fallen from 
$830,000 to $30,000 because of the resulting restrictions on land use.94 
3. Sam Pullig of Belle Chasse, Louisiana 
Sam Pullig owns 1,000 acres of land in Louisiana. Mr. Pullig has been 
trying for two years to get permission from the Fish & Wildlife Service to 
harvest $200,000 worth of timber.95 He needs a permit because six red-
cockaded woodpeckers, members of an endangered species, are nesting on 
his land. As Mr. Pullig explained at a congressional field hearing, “with 
added finance and other expenses, ‘these birds, weighing about 7 ounces 
each, are costing me about $6,000 per ounce.’”96 He further stated, “‘I’m 
tired and angry that I’m being treated so unfairly.’”97 
 
 90. Id.; Growing with Less Water, HERALD & NEWS, at http://www.heraldandnews.com/articles/ 
2003/07/31/news/agriculture/awater.txt (July 31, 2003). 
 91. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Water Allocation Decision Announced for Klamath 
Project (Apr. 6, 2001), http://www.doi.gov/news/010409.html. 
 92. John D. Cramer, Thousands turn out to protest Klamath irrigation shutdown, THE BULLETIN 
(Bend, Or.), May 14, 2001, http://www.bendbulletin.com/news/story.cfm?story_no=4014. 
 93. James V. DeLong, Editorial, It’s My Land, Isn’t It?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A25. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bob Anderson, Task Force Hears Louisianans’ Environmental Law Problems, THE ADVOC. 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Mar. 14, 1995, at 1A. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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B. And Now The Buried Parts of the Tales 
Not surprisingly, some of the less sympathetic details of these stories 
were omitted or deselected, as have some of the most basic elements of the 
stories. 
1. John Crawford Had Some Immediate Relief Available 
Though the Bureau of Reclamation’s initial determination was to re-
strict severely the use of water by farmers in the Klamath Basin,98 John 
Crawford was not as high and dry as one might have thought. First, the 
federal government provided $75 million in relief for those affected by the 
water restrictions.99 Secondly, some farms did receive their allotment of 
water.100 And federal crop insurance of over $135 million101 and the Non-
insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program were available to the farmers.102 
Thus, this story is certainly not one of lack of compensation. Perhaps the 
question that really needs to be asked is whether the compensation offered 
was just. You will not find such a distinction, however, in Mr. Crawford’s 
version of the story nor will you find any details of how he calculated the 
farmers’ expected losses. 
 
 98. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra note 91. 
 99. Twenty-five million dollars in relief is provided by Energy and Water Development Appro-
priations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 132, 117 Stat. 1827, 1840-41 (2003). Of that amount $2.6 
million was provided for reimbursement for expenses incurred by those who did not receive their water 
allotment and the remainder was designated to improve “efficiency and use” of the existing water sup-
ply. H.R. REP. NO. 108-212, at 102 (2003). Also, the Erodable Land and Wetland Conservation and 
Reserve Program specifically provides $50 million for water conservation through cost-share payments, 
incentive payments, and loans to carry out water conservation projects in Klamath Basin to enhance the 
quality and increase the quantity of water available to farmers and ranchers. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-(9)(c) 
(2000). 
 100. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Interior Secretary to Order Water Release to 
Klamath Farmers, at http://www.doi.gov/news/010724a.html (July 24, 2001) (announcing that seventy 
to seventy-five thousand acre-feet of water would be released from Upper Klamath Lake to assist farm-
ers in need). 
 101. In California, farmers in the following counties received insurance payments and in the fol-
lowing amounts: Humboldt – $509,993; Tehama – $16,642,145; Siskiyou – $3,984,788; Shasta – 
$1,535,505; Modoc – $2,524,487; Glen – $41,491,332; and Butte – $56,019,285 for a total of 
$122,707,535. Data was not available for Trinity and Del Norte counties. In Oregon, farmers in the fol-
lowing counties received insurance payments and in the following amounts: Klamath – $2,288,777; 
Lake – $2,298,275; and Jackson – $7,756,564 for a total of $12,343,616. Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration, at http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/stateCountyCrop.cfm (last modified April 19, 2004). 
 102. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra note 91. 
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2. Margaret Rector Turned Down an Offer for $525,000 
The government was willing to pay Ms. Rector $82,500, less than 
10% of the tax assessed value in 1989,103 but still the government had of-
fered something. Also, in 1994 Ms. Rector had a purchase offer of 
$525,000, but wanted $600,000 and thus turned it down.104 Lastly, Ms. 
Rector’s land was part of a regional habitat conservation plan and she 
would have been assessed a mitigation fee of between $600 and $3,000 per 
acre or $9,000 up to $45,000 total.105 The Service uses mitigation fees to 
purchase land in the same habitat.106 And “[e]ven Miss Rector doesn’t en-
tirely blame the warbler for her troubles. ‘I have to say that part of [the de-
crease] was the economy.’”107 One prospective buyer of Ms. Rector’s land 
said that he had purchased nearby land for one-fifth of its 1985 value and 
explained that the drop in price had nothing to do with the Endangered 
Species Act because it never applied to the property that he purchased.108 
Thus, not taking into account any other market forces that may have af-
fected the value of her land (such as the savings and loan crisis and the fal-
tering real estate market in Texas),109 and assuming that she would have 
been unable to recoup the fee when she ultimately sold the property, at 
most the value of Ms. Rector’s land had been diminished by five percent as 
a result of the enforcement of the Act. 
3. Sam Pullig’s Birds Were on the Original Endangered Species List 
Sam Pullig told his story at a congressional “field hearing” in Belle 
Chasse, Louisiana in March 1995.110 Yet this account neglected one key de-
tail: Mr. Pullig knew the birds were nesting on the land before he bought it 
 
 103. John Anderson, This Land is My Land, SMARTMONEY, Sept. 1, 1996, at 106, available at 
1996 WL 16053079. 
 104. George Rodrique, Act’s Effect on Land Disputed: Habitat Preservation is Blamed for Drop in 
Value, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996, available at 1996 WL 2109750. 
 105. Melinda E. Taylor, supra note 57. One potential buyer of Ms. Rector’s land said that the Ser-
vice told him that upon payment of a $44,000 mitigation fee, he could develop the land. Rodrique, su-
pra note 104. He believes that the fee is 6% of the land’s ultimate value. Id. 
 106. Anderson, supra note 103. 
 107. Rodrique, supra note 104. 
 108. Id. 
 109. In 1987, “[l]osses at Texas S&Ls comprise more than one-half of all S&L losses nationwide, 
and of the 20 largest losses, 14 are in Texas. Texas economy in major recession: crude oil prices fall by 
nearly 50%, office vacancy is over 30%, and real estate prices collapse.” FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A 
Chrono-Bibliography, at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2002). See 
also Rodrique, supra note 104 (noting the collapse of the savings and loan industry and the drop in real 
estate prices in Austin). 
 110. Heather Dewar, Lawmakers Hear Cajuns’ Gripes Over Wildlife Laws, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 
17, 1995, at A13. 
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for logging in 1993.111 He had planned “to leave a 200-foot circle of uncut 
trees around each nest but was dismayed to learn that his plan would not 
satisfy federal wildlife managers.”112 Lest any sympathy remain for this 
landowner, the red-cockaded woodpecker was listed as an endangered spe-
cies on June 2, 1970113 and was designated as a “national species of special 
emphasis” in 1983.114 Such species “are considered to be of high biological, 
legal, and public interest and merit special effort and attention by the Ser-
vice at the national level.”115 The only surprised party in this instance 
would have been the Service if this landowner had filed a takings claim. 
IV.  THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORMS 
Having sampled some of the stories, this Article now turns to some of 
the proposed reforms. Among them were requirements for “takings impact 
analysis,” sound science, cost-benefit analysis, and consultation under sec-
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The legislative proposals for direct 
compensation for which the horror stories were the prelude would have se-
rious implications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. 
Simply put, the bills would have compensated landowners for losses that 
were less than complete, turning Supreme Court precedent on its head. In 
addition, this Part of the Article addresses the potential for abuse by large 
landholders and evaluates the choice of remedies offered. It also evaluates 
them according to how well they address the purported concern for small 
landowners. This Part also considers the use of appropriations riders to try 
to accomplish what could not be done through the headline grabbers such 
as the Private Property Rights Act of 1995. 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 35 Fed. Reg. 8495 (1970); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2004) (endangered species list). The U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that a takings claim is not barred by the fact that title to property was acquired 
after the effective date of a regulation. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-631 (2001). How-
ever, the concurring opinion states that with respect to the reasonable investment-backed expectations 
factor of Penn Central takings analysis, the temporal relationship between the enactment of the regula-
tion and the acquisition of title does help to shape the reasonableness of those expectations and to de-
termine whether a compensable taking has occurred. Id. at 632-36. 
 114. 48 Fed. Reg. 55,049 (1983). 
 115. Id. 
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A. The Darling of the “Reform” Movement: Direct Compensation Statutes 
Beginning with the Contract with America in the 104th Congress116 
and in almost every Congress thereafter, conservatives have introduced 
measures to provide private landowners compensation whenever enforce-
ment of the ESA results in any diminution in the value of private land. 
These bills basically mimic each other but for the percentage (or dollar 
amount) of diminution in the value of property needed to trigger compensa-
tion.117 For this discussion, the Article focuses on the Endangered Species 
Land Management Reform Act introduced in the 107th Congress.118 
The proposed Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act 
provided that— 
No agency may take an action under this Act affecting privately owned 
property that results in the diminishment of the value of any portion of 
that property by an amount equal to or greater than 50 percent of the 
value of that portion unless compensation is offered in accordance with 
this section.119 
Compensation for the diminishment would have taken one of two forms: 
(1) payment for the diminution in value or (2) at the option of the owner, 
the agency would have been required to buy the affected portion of the 
property by paying the “fair market value” of that portion based on the 
value before the diminution and without regard to the presence of or use by 
a listed species.120 In order to obtain compensation, the private property 
owner would have to submit a written request.121 The Endangered Species 
Land Management Reform Act further provided that if the agency and the 
property owner were not able to agree upon the amount of compensation 
 
 116. See e.g., S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995) (landowner entitled to compensation when “deprived of 
$10,000, or 20 percent or more of the fair market value of the affected portion of the property”); H.R. 
790, 104th Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of 50 percent or more of the fair 
market value, or the economically viable use of the affected portion of the property”). 
 117. See, e.g., H.R. 472, 107th Cong. (2001) (entitled to compensation or to be bought out for 
diminution of value of 25% or more); H.R. 1142, 106th Cong. (1999); (entitled to compensation for the 
fair market value of the federal use of the property or portion thereof); H.R. 495, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(entitled to compensation for diminution of value of 50% or more); S. 781, 105th Cong. (1997) (entitled 
to compensation if there is a temporary or permanent diminution in property value greater than 33%); 
H.R. 4335, 105th Cong. (1998) (entitled to compensation when value of any portion of land is reduced 
by 50% or more); S. 239, 104th Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of $10,000, or 
20 percent or more of the fair market value of the affected portion of the property”); H.R. 790, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (entitled to compensation when “deprived of 50 percent or more of the fair market value, 
or the economically viable use of the affected portion of the property”). 
 118. H.R. 1403, 107th Cong. (2001). Thus far, no such bill has been introduced in the 108th Con-
gress. 
 119. Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act, H.R. 1403, 107th Cong., § 2(a) (2001). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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within 180 days of the property owner’s written request for compensation, 
“the owner of the property may elect binding arbitration through alternative 
dispute resolution or seek compensation due under this section in a civil ac-
tion.”122 The parties could agree to extend the 180-day period without af-
fecting the ability of the landowner to choose arbitration or court action.123 
The arbitral proceedings were to be conducted in accordance with proce-
dures established by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).124 
Borrowing from the language of the Fifth Amendment, the proposed 
legislation also provided that a landowner who prevailed in a civil action 
would be entitled to “just compensation,” as well as “attorney’s fees and 
other litigation costs, including appraisal fees.”125 Moreover, the bill pro-
vided for the establishment of the Species Conservation Fund to carry out 
projects on private land to conserve listed species. No further appropria-
tions would have been made available for this purpose, however.126 If 
money were not available in the fund, the agency would have to pay the 
award out of the following year’s appropriations.127 
The Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act and other 
similar proposals for compensation128 are interesting for a number of rea-
sons. First, they appear to be an attempt to overrule the Supreme Court’s 
determination of the relevant parcel of land for consideration of lost value 
in takings cases under the Fifth Amendment.129 Second, landowners may 
abuse the scheme by skewing their development plans to heap the majority 
of the project onto the regulated portion of their property and then use the 
amendments’ explicit rights of compensation to fund the development of 
the rest of the property. Interestingly, the larger the landowner’s holdings, 
the better able he would be to profit from the legislation, even if he had no 
reasonable investment-backed expectations. These proposals also have 
been criticized as nothing more than an entitlement for large landowners 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. § 3(a). 
 127. Id. § 2(a). 
 128. For the purposes of this discussion, the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 2000, H.R. 
472, 107th Cong. is essentially the same proposal, though differing in three significant respects. It sets 
the threshold level of diminution in value at 25% and it does not establish a special fund for compensa-
tion. It also attempts to “clarify” the definition of “take” as now defined in the regulations, 50 C.F.R.  
§ 17.3 (2001), that was the source of controversy in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon v. Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 129. See e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that Court 
must consider the parcel as a whole). 
092804 BURKE.DOC 10/12/2004  4:24 PM 
2004] KLAMATH FARMERS AND CAPPUCCINO COWBOYS 465 
and lawyers.130 And finally, they provided for arbitration of claims because 
arbitration was argued to be a more viable option than litigation for small 
landowners. The following discussion will examine these criticisms as well 
as analyze the bill’s impact on small landowners. 
1. Implications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence 
In Penn Central Transportation v. New York City,131 the U.S. Supreme 
Court, although unable to establish a “set formula,” identified several fac-
tors to be weighed in determining whether a regulation has effected a tak-
ing.132 These factors included (1) the character of the regulation, (2) the 
economic impact of the regulation upon the private property owner, and  
(3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations of the property owner.133 The Court used these 
factors as a balancing test to resolve conflicts between the interests of the 
affected private property owner and the interests of the general public. The 
Court has consistently held that regulations cannot force “‘some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.’”134 Yet, the Court has also recognized that 
in fulfilling its function as a protector of the public good, “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”135 
The Court thus saw a need to balance these interests and consequently has 
engaged in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”136 to strike a balance be-
tween these competing interests. The Court, however, has “found categori-
cal treatment appropriate where regulation denies all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of land.”137 The Court acknowledged, however, that 
this rule does not “make clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss 
of value is to be measured.”138 Thus, it appears that the Court will continue 
making ad hoc factual inquiries. 
The proposed legislation attempts to provide “categorical treatment” 
as an answer to the Court’s open question.139 It seems on its face that rather 
 
 130.  E.g., 141 CONG. REC. E823-25, E823 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller) (arguing that large 
companies would receive most of the compensation). 
 131. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 132. Id. at 124. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 135. Id. at 124 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 138. Id. at 1016 n.7. 
 139. “In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case . . . .” Id. at 1016. 
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than investigating the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the 
reasonable investment-backed expectations of a particular landowner, the 
bill would grant blanket relief regardless of the characteristics of the spe-
cific property or the legitimate expectations of the landowner (for example, 
at the time of acquisition did the owner know of the existence of the en-
dangered species and the likely limitations on the development of the par-
cel). Yet, the Court’s fact-based approach arguably is the only sensible one 
because it recognizes the potential conflict between the interests of the in-
dividual property owner and the public. 
Takings determinations are a judicial matter. The judicial compro-
mise . . . entails an inquiry—often detailed and fact-laden—into which 
rights are “vested” or legitimately expected and which are not, and how 
much damage is an unacceptable burden on an existing owner. Such in-
quiries are necessarily case-by-case, messy though it seems. . . . 
[E]xpectations vary enormously, and include questions of timing and 
conditions of purchase, and other quite individualized questions.140 
And the Court has reaffirmed the Penn Central analysis recently in Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island.141 Justice O’Connor explained in her concurring opin-
ion that Penn Central remains the “polestar” in cases of partial takings.142 
Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is 
one of a number of factors that a court must examine. Further, the regu-
latory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at is-
sue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations. 
. . . . 
. . . The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direc-
tion must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.143 
The tribunals would have to determine at what point in time the relevant 
investment-backed expectations formed. Should value be judged against 
the expectations at the time of acquisition, at the time of discovery of a 
listed species on the property, at the time the landowner devises a devel-
opment plan that concentrates her activity in the habitat of the listed spe-
cies, or at some other point in time which the tribunal believes accurately 
reflects the loss suffered by the landowner? 
What may be the most significant part of the legislation is that it 
would change the relevant parcel for determination of diminution of value, 
 
 140. Private Property Rights, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
(1995) [hereinafter Private Property Rights Hearing] (statement of Carol M. Rose, Gordon Bradford 
Tweedy Professor of Law & Organization, Yale Law School), 1995 WL 152059. 
 141. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 142. Id. at 633. 
 143. Id. 
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which would indicate the economic impact of the regulation. Instead of 
looking at the parcel as a whole, the bill would allow the landowner to 
claim a taking if the ESA’s prohibitions lowered the value of a portion of 
her land. Compare this legislative approach with that of the Court. 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments and attempt to determine whether the rights in a particular seg-
ment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular gov-
ernmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on 
the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interfer-
ence with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .144 
If a landowner could be compensated for a percentage loss of any portion 
of her parcel, the tribunals settling these claims would still need to ascertain 
the relevant parcel, for “[t]o posit a 10% or 20% or 30% diminution in 
value as a taking still does not answer the question, ‘percent of what?’”145 
Recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, the Court answered that question and rejected the peti-
tioners’ “conceptual severance” argument because it ignored Penn Cen-
tral’s direction to consider the parcel as a whole.146 
Furthermore, the legislative proposal would allow a landowner to ma-
nipulate her development plans to concentrate them in the area affected by 
the legislation and thus receive compensation, even though the regulations 
could have had a minimal economic impact but for her skewing her activi-
ties. The potential for such abuse is discussed more fully in the next sec-
tion. 
2. Potential for Abuse 
Like the many compensation bills that preceded it, the Endangered 
Species Land Management Reform Act is rife with potential for abuse. 
Small landowners would not be the chief beneficiaries of such a provision. 
Instead, entities with large holdings would be able to manipulate their de-
velopment to take advantage of the compensation offered under the legisla-
tion. For example, Representative Sam Farr of California criticized a simi-
lar proposal, the Private Property Rights Act of 1995,147 because, in his 
view, creating a right of compensation for a diminution of value of a por-
 
 144. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
 145. Private Property Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of Carol M. Rose, Gordon Brad-
ford Tweedy Professor of Law & Organization, Yale Law School), 1995 WL 152059. 
 146. 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). 
 147. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995). 
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tion of one’s property would generate numerous bad faith claims.148 Land-
owners who had no reasonable, investment-backed expectations of profit-
ing from the portion of the land affected by the Act could concoct plans to 
focus development on the affected portion.149 In one floor debate, Repre-
sentative Farr spun out the following worst-case scenario: 
Just think, you can own a piece of land and you know that land may be 
thousands of acres, but you have a couple of acres that are in wetlands. 
Maybe you have a couple of acres that are in that habitat of an identified 
endangered species; not the whole property, just that couple of acres. 
You can say, “All right, I want to do all my development right on those 
couple of acres.” You know that the government will prohibit you from 
taking, and you can then say, “That is a taking. You have taken my land. 
Compensate me for it. Then I am going to use that compensation to build 
all over the rest of the land.”150 
Interestingly, large landowners will have a greater ability to manipulate 
their land holdings to both the benefit and detriment of U.S. taxpayers. Un-
der a scheme in which preserving a portion of one’s land for the listed spe-
cies is required, large landowners are more able to adjust their development 
plans to provide for such a preserve than small landowners are. This ability 
to manipulate development could also be used to gain unjust compensation 
by skewing development plans to concentrate the activity in the habitat ar-
eas. Thus large landowners could be the big winners under this legislation. 
Representative Martin Olav Sabo pointed out a variation on this po-
tential bad faith scheme. He opposed The Private Property Rights Act of 
1995 in part because “[c]ompensation would be due even when the Gov-
ernment was simply denying permission for an activity that the landowner 
knew would not be allowed when he acquired the land.”151 It is not difficult 
to imagine sham acquisitions. Remember Sam Pullig of Belle Chase, Lou-
isiana in Part III.A.1. and how an endangered species of bird was costing 
him about $6,000 an ounce? Mr. Pullig knew the birds were nesting on the 
land before he bought it for logging in 1993.152 Under the proposed com-
pensation statutes, Mr. Pullig would have been compensated for his “loss.” 
 
 148. 141 CONG. REC. H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Farr); Private Property 
Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL 
152039. 
 149. See S. Rep. No. 104-239, at 58 (1996) (citing written statement of Prof. Carol M. Rose of Apr. 
6, 1995 at 12-13 on the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 650, 104th Cong. (1995)). 
 150. 141 CONG. REC. H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Farr); Private Property 
Rights Hearing, supra note 141 (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL 
152039. 
 151. 141 Cong. REC. H2463 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Sabo). 
 152. Heather Dewar, supra note 110. 
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3. Arbitration Not a Panacea 
The Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act would have 
provided a “choice of remedies,” giving the landowner the option of arbi-
tration or civil litigation if she and the agency could not agree upon the 
amount of compensation due.153 This choice, however, would not have nec-
essarily made the process less expensive or complex. For example, one 
would expect the parties frequently to disagree on the appropriate amount 
of compensation, if any, and thus battle to demonstrate why the facts of the 
particular situation merit the compensation each party proposes. 
This choice of remedies also could create a windfall for attorneys in-
volved in the resulting litigation or arbitration to settle disputes about the 
fair market value of the parcel.154 Concurrently, this provision would in-
crease the workload of the Service and the U.S. Department of Justice in 
defending against these claims.155 One local government planning official 
described such legislation as “‘a nightmare of dueling appraisers and duel-
ing lawyers.”156 And these proposals were occurring “at a time when the 
Government downsizing is the rallying cry.”157 Using either dispute resolu-
tion mechanism, each side would employ appraisers and the tribunal would 
decide whose appraisal was accurate.158 Also, note that while this type of 
legislation was pending, agricultural corporations—not family farmers—in 
California’s Central Valley were already preparing lawsuits in anticipation 
of the passage of this legislation.159 
 
 153. H.R. 1403, 107th Cong., § 2 (2001). 
 154. As Representative Conyers retorted in the Congressional floor debate trying to push through 
another bill with similar provisions, “Better this bill be entitled ‘Bureaucrats and Lawyers Relief 
Acts’?” CONG. REC. H2465 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995). 
 155.  
Agencies would need to hire more employees to process compensation claims, more lawyers 
to handle claims, more investigators and expert witnesses to determine the validity of claims, 
more appraisers to assess the extent to which agency action has affected property value, and 
more arbiters to resolve claims. The sheer volume of entitlement requests under these 
schemes would be overwhelming. The result would be far more government, not less. 
Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 605 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General), 1995 WL 152039, at 
*8. But see Tom Turner, Unsettling Development, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 32, 33 (arguing 
that the Department of Justice is not defending the laws, is excluding intervenors who might defend the 
law, and is quickly and quietly settling cases on highly favorable terms for the industry groups or states 
who challenge the laws). 
 156. Charles McCoy, Private Matter: The Push to Expand Property Rights Stirs Both Hopes and 
Fears, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995, at A1. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. (“‘Property owners will have their appraisers, and we’ll have ours, and we’ll go around 
and around and around.’”). 
 159. See id. The Department of Agriculture’s latest Census of Agriculture indicates that 3% of the 
farms in this country produce more than 60% of the country’s agricultural products. “The data offered 
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Furthermore, while it is true that not everyone has the financial means 
to sue the U.S. Government, arbitration is not without costs. The American 
Arbitration Association’s initial filing fee and case service fee (due at the 
first hearing) are based upon the amount of the claim and are set out below 
in Figure 1.160 
 
Figure 1 – AAA Initial Filing Fees 
 




Above $0 to $10,000 $500 $200 
Above $10,000 to $75,000 $750 $300 
Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1,500 $750 
Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2,750 $1,250 
Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4,250 $1,750 
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6,000 $2,500 
Above $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 $8,000 $3,250 
Above $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 $10,000 $4,000 
Above $10,000,000161  
 
 
Thus, a claimant would pay between $700 and $14,000 for a case in which 
a hearing was held for claims ranging from $0 to 10,000 up to claims of 
$10 million.162 In addition to these fees, the parties are responsible for any 
expenses of AAA representatives working on the claim.163 
Then an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators would be selected. Currently, 
the rules of the AAA provide that if the claim does not exceed $50,000, the 
AAA will appoint a single arbitrator.164 If all the parties request a list of po-
tential arbitrators, upon payment of a service charge the AAA will provide 
such a list.165 Unlike litigation, wherein our system of checks and balances 
has selected the judge, here either the AAA will choose the arbitrator or the 
 
evidence that American farming is being powered more and more by size . . . .” Ira Dreyfuss, Big 
Farms Continue to Squeeze Smaller Ones, HOUS. CHRON., June 4, 2004, at 3C. 
 160. American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for the Real Estate Industry (Including a 
Mediation Alternative), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/ 
focusArea/commercial/AAA120current.htm (as amended and effective July 1, 2003). 
 161. Parties must contact their local AAA office for fees applicable for claims in excess of $10 million. 
Id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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property owner may have input on the choice, without regard to the compe-
tency of the owner to make a wise selection. 
Then there is the cost of the arbitrator. Reviewing the resumes of the 
265 mediators166 who list “construction” among their specialties reveals 
that the average costs are $255 per hour for the mediator’s compensation 
and $75.00 per hour for administrative fees.167 Mediators are paid at their 
regular rates for study time (for such tasks as studying pre-hearing briefs 
and exhibits168) as well as writing opinions or findings of facts and conclu-
sions.169 Arbitrators are also paid for travel expenses including transporta-
tion, lodging, and meals if appropriate.170 
Parties to arbitration also must pay the cost of a hearing room171 and 
meeting rooms if appropriate. By contrast taxpayers pay the fees of the in-
stitution in litigation, i.e., the U.S. courts. A report by the public interest 
group Public Citizen contends that the costs of arbitration will almost al-
ways be more than the costs of litigation. 
The same support personnel that expedite cases at a courthouse, such as 
file clerks and court administrators, are also necessary to manage arbitra-
tion cases. But because arbitration provider organizations handle fewer 
cases over larger geographic areas, the economy of scale in a court 
clerk’s office cannot be achieved, increasing the administrative cost per 
case. Thus, while it costs the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County 
an average of $44.20 to administer a case, AAA’s administrative cost per 
case averages $340.63, about 700 percent more. 172 
This report is not without its critics, however, who argue that the conclu-
sions drawn are largely inapplicable to the typical lower-income claimant 
involved in consumer and employment disputes.173 These critics cite the re-
 
 166. Information regarding arbitrators is not publicly available. Presumably, their rates would be 
comparable, if not higher. 
 167. Data compiled from resumes available at http://www.mediatorindex.com (fees range from $75 
to $600 per hour). 
 168. The AAA lists among possible exhibits that could be relevant in this context, appraisal reports; 
a survey of the parcel; real estate assessed valuation, appropriate local tax rates, and aggregate tax 
charges; building plans and specifications; executed copies of leases in force; environmental audits; any 
feasibility, market, or other advisory reports; and environmental impact studies. American Arbitration 
Association, supra note 162. 
 169. http://www.mediatorindex.com (last visited May 5, 2004). 
 170. Id. 
 171. American Arbitration Association, supra note 162. 
 172. Public Citizen, The Costs of Arbitration (Apr. 2002), http://www.citizen.org/publications/ 
print_release.cfm?ID=7173#o. 
 173. Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration: A Critique of Pub-
lic Citizen’s Jeremaiad on the “Costs of Arbitration”, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2002/Jan. 2003, at 8, 10. 
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port’s use of a dispute involving a $605,000 custom-designed home,174 but 
for purposes of this analysis the size of that claim fits squarely within the 
parameters of this private property rights conflict.175 For example, Margaret 
Rector claimed that enforcement of the ESA caused her property to lose 
approximately $800,000 in value. If she were to pursue arbitration under 
the current rules, the initial filing fee would be $6,000 and for a hearing the 
case service fee would be $2,500. On the other hand, if she filed her case in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, in Aus-
tin, her filing fee would be $150176 and there would be no “case service 
fee.” 
Then, of course, in arbitration each party has the option of being rep-
resented by counsel. One would not expect the hourly rates to be lower for 
arbitration than for litigation. If fact, the rates may be greater in arbitration 
because of the need for legal counsel experienced in arbitration and real es-
tate.177 
Even with these fee differentials and additional party-borne costs (ar-
bitrator vs. judge; hearing room vs. courtroom), the total fees still have the 
potential to be lower in arbitration than in litigation, however, because arbi-
tration is usually a shorter process than litigation.178 Yet a recent survey of 
commercial arbitrators showed that 72% of them “believe that arbitration is 
becoming too much like court litigation and thereby losing its promise of 
providing an expedited and cost-efficient means of resolving commercial 
disputes.”179 Thus, the argument that arbitration uniformly is a better choice 
than litigation for small or large private landowners is doubtful at best and 
may lead to a wasting of the very resources the bill claims to protect. 
 
 174. Id. (comparing litigation and arbitration costs and pointing out how arbitration associations 
have recently lowered fees for consumers and employees with businesses paying the bulk of the fees). 
 175. See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 93 (citing Margaret Rector’s market value loss of approximately 
$800,000); Leslie Spencer, No Dream House for Mr. Burris, FORBES, July 18, 1994, at 78 (describing 
Burris’ market value loss of approximately $1.5 million). 
 176. Fee Schedule for the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas at 
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/fees/feesched.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). 
 177. Compare MAXWELL J. FULTON, COMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 67-69 
(1989) (“Most disputes now require an arbitrator who is more experienced in law than engineering and 
who can assemble a team of specialist lawyers. An arbitrator who is acceptable to both parties may not 
be available for more than 12 months and can cost several thousand dollars.”), and Harry Kaminsky, 
Cave Arbitration? . . . Let’s Get Real!, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 31, 1994, at 11 (“savings are generally found 
in the amount of attorneys fees paid as a result of limited discovery and decreased time involved in 
achieving a final disposition”) (Kaminsky was a Regional Vice President of the American Arbitration 
Association). 
 178. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration? DISP. RESOL. J., Feb./Apr. 
2003, at 37, 39; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 678-79 (1996). 
 179. Phillips, supra note 180, at 37, 38. 
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To assess the comparative societal values of binding arbitration and liti-
gation one must analyze both the costs and benefits of the two alterna-
tives. From a cost standpoint, not everyone would agree that binding ar-
bitration is cheaper and quicker than litigation. As arbitrations become 
more complex they become more like litigation and just as expensive. 
Further, even to the extent one can show that resolving a case through 
arbitration is cheaper than resolving the case through trial, the fact is that 
most claims never make it to trial. To the extent that parties choose to 
take a case to arbitration that either would not have been litigated or 
would have settled quickly had it been litigated, arbitration may actually 
increase societal costs.180 
Nothing ensures that the battle will be less costly with the American 
Arbitration Association, for example, than in the courtroom. What is more, 
unlike earlier versions of this bill,181 the Endangered Species Land Man-
agement Reform Act does not provide that a property owner who prevails 
in arbitration is entitled to receive costs. Only through a civil action is the 
owner entitled to receive reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation 
costs, including appraisal fees.182 Also, going to arbitration does not assure 
a property owner that she also will not be involved in litigation. The gov-
ernment may appeal the arbitration decision to a U.S. district court or to the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.183 
B. The Appropriations Approach 
Here is where the administration and Congress have joined ranks ef-
fectively to set the agenda for the Fish and Wildlife Service. Because the 
Act has not been reauthorized, the administration must make a yearly 
budget request to fund the activities of the Service. Not surprisingly, an in-
creasing amount of money has been devoted to grants as opposed to en-
forcement or designation of critical habitat. The administration congratu-
lates itself for requesting more total funds each year and then Congress in 
turn gets to congratulate itself for appropriating even more money than re-
quested. Yet the purposes of the increased appropriations are not manifest. 
For example, even though the Service had a larger budget for FY 2003 than 
FY 2002,184 it announced in March 2003 that it would be unable to desig-
nate critical habitat for 33 species before fiscal year-end September 30 be-
 
 180. Sternlight, supra note 180, at 695. 
 181. Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 6(d) (1995). 
 182. Endangered Species Land Management Reform Act, H.R. 1403, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001). 
 183. Id. § (e)(2)(A). 
 184. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service at http://www.doi.gov/budget/2003/ 
03Hilites/BH53.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004). 
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cause its $6 million budget was $2 million short.185 The same problem oc-
curred in fiscal year 2002.186 The Service attributes the problem to litiga-
tion costs from both sides: environmental groups and developers.187 Yet al-
though the number of lawsuits regarding critical habitat has been increasing 
yearly since sometime during the Clinton Administration,188 the Bush Ad-
ministration has not requested more money from Congress to deal with its 
present reality.189 
Though the head-line grabbers of the 104th Congress and forward dealt 
with such bills as the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995,190 the Private 
Property Owners’ Bill of Rights,191 the Landowners Equal Treatment 
Act,192 and the Life, Liberty, and Property Protection Act,193 Congress also 
tried to make substantive changes to the ESA through riders on appropria-
tions bills.194 As John Leshy, the Solicitor for the Department of Interior 
from 1993 until 2001, so colorfully explained, “The Interior Appropriations 
bill seemed to attract mischievous riders like flies. The White House led the 
mostly successful fight against them, but it often required a substantial per-
sonal commitment of the Secretary.”195 Notwithstanding this commitment, 
apparently former Secretary Babbitt engaged in this appropriations game as 
well to prevent the use of other funds to address critical habitat, fearing that 
the lawsuits and the resultant studies would deplete the Service’s resources 
so that it could not perform many of its other functions.196 As attorneys for 
the EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund described the situation, 
 
 185. Jennifer 8. Lee, Money Gone, U.S. Suspends Designations of Habitats, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2003, at A18. 
 186. See U.S. Dept. of Interior, Press Release: Endangered Species Act Broken—Flood of 
Litigation over Critical Habitat Hinders Species Conservation available at http://endangered.fws.gov/ 
criticalhabitat/ch_pressrelease.pdf (May 28, 2003). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Lee, supra note 185. 
 189. Id. 
 190. S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 191. S. 953, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 192. H. R. 1142, 106th Cong. (1999) 
 193. H.R. 5709, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 194. E.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense 
to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, ch. 4, 109 Stat. 73, 86 
(1995) (creating moratorium on listing species and designating critical habitat by rescinding funds to 
Interior). 
 195. Leshy, supra note 64, at 209. Though these efforts to amend the Act through such riders were 
largely unsuccessful when former President Bill Clinton was in office, with Republicans controlling the 
White House and the legislature, however, one commentator has predicted the revival of this strategy. 
Dan Fagin, A New Environment: Bush Seeks to Reshape Laws of the Land (and Air), NEWSDAY, Jan. 
12, 2003, at A04. 
 196. Lee, supra note 185. For example, the budget for 2003 provides that funds— 
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For fiscal year 1998, for instance, the service [sic] asked for a tiny 
budget increase of $190,000 for the listing and critical habitat program, 
for a grand total of $5.19 million for the entire year—less than 7% of the 
entire endangered species budget, and less than any other agency budget 
request since the early [Former President George H.W.] Bush years. 
Only rarely will Congress exceed a presidential budget request, and the 
FWS duly received the starvation diet it had requested. 
Even more mind-boggling is that in fiscal 1997, 1998, and 1999 the FWS 
also specially demanded that Congress limit its budget for critical habitat 
designation and listing. The House Conference Report on the 1998 
budget specifically reflects DOI’s role in obtaining a budget cap: “As re-
quested by the Department of the Interior, the managers reluctantly have 
agreed to limit statutorily the funds for the endangered species listing 
program.”197 
This insistence on a limited budget for section 4 activities provides 
support for these lawyers’ further contention that the FWS unilaterally de-
cided that the designation of critical habitat was an expensive and worthless 
process, though there was no actual amendment of the statute.198 In their 
estimation, the FWS had succumbed to the will of private property rights 
groups and developers199 and had freed itself from complying with law.200 
“At its bottom, the tactic is nothing less than collusion between the execu-
 
not to exceed $9,077,000 shall be used for implementing subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) of 
section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, as amended, for species that are indigenous to the 
United States (except for processing petitions, developing and issuing proposed and final 
regulations, and taking any other steps to implement actions described in subsection 
(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B)(i), or (c)(2)(B)(ii)), of which not to exceed $6,000,000 shall be used for 
any activity regarding the designation of critical habitat, pursuant to subsection (a)(3), exclud-
ing litigation support, for species already listed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) as of the date of 
enactment this Act. 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 220-21 (2002). See 
also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-63, 
115 Stat. 414, 419 (2001) (limiting to $9 million the amount to be used to implement subsection (a), (b), 
(c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-201, 114 Stat. 922, 926 (2000) (limiting to $6,355,000 the amount to be 
used to implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA), Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-139 (1999); Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-236 
(1998) (limiting to $5,756,000 the amount to be used to implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of 
section 4 of the ESA); Appropriations for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-83, 111 Stat. 1543, 1547 (1997) (limiting to $5,190,000 the amount to be use for 
implement subsection (a), (b), (c), and (e) of section 4 of the ESA). 
 197. Robert Wiygul & Heather Weiner, Critical Habitat Destruction, THE ENVTL. FORUM, 
May/June 1999, at 13, 18. 
 198. Id. at 13. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 16. 
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tive and the Congress to weaken a popular substantive law in a way that 
keeps the public out of the loop.”201 
Bush’s proposed 2004 Budget provides $129 million for the endan-
gered species program. This budget request is said to include a 35 percent 
increase for the listing program to handle litigation. In contrast, the admini-
stration anticipates dispersing $822 million through grants, including $50 
million for the Landowner Incentive and Private stewardship programs.202 
C. The End Result in Congress 
Some may consider Congress to have failed miserably in its efforts to 
change species protection.203 The parade of bills, falling by the wayside 
session after session, has been described as a “successful juggernaut” in 
that Congress has kept the agency from moving forward with some needed 
changes. But it has been successful in another way as well. As one com-
mentator observed, 
Democrats still have enough leverage to block major legislation in the 
closely divided Senate and House, but Bush now has a freer hand to 
make policy changes through administrative actions in key agencies such 
as the Interior Department . . . . That’s because agency officials will no 
longer face hostile scrutiny from Democratic Senate committee chairs 
with the power to convene oversight hearings and issue subpoenas.204 
Indeed, this “successful juggernaut” has laid the groundwork for that which 
the Executive Branch is evolving. As J.B. Ruhl has explained, legislative 
proposals were nothing but “wish lists” for both sides.205 He predicted that 
Congress would not makes any changes to the ESA, but “[i]nstead, rhetori-
 
 201. Id. at 18. 
 202. OMB, Department of Interior, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/ 
interior.html (last visited May 5, 2004). 
 203. Although the U.S. Congress has been unsuccessful in passing any “takings” legislation, many 
states have been successful. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1311 to -1313 (West 1999 & Supp. 
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-20-201 to -205 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 
(1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 1998); Idaho Code §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Michie 1995); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-32 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -711 (Supp. 
2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3609-3:3611 (West Supp. 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341 
(West Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.421 to -425 (West Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 49-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.017 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN.     § 
2-10-101 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.425 (Michie 1995); N.M.STAT. ANN. § 74-6-12 (Michie 
Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-02.5 (Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.772 (1997); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to -206 (Supp. 1998); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.001 (Vernon Supp. 
2000). UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-2 to -4 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:7.1 (Michie 1998); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-1A-1 to -6 (1998); WYO. 
STAT. ANN § 9-5-301 (Michie 2001). 
 204. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 205. See Ruhl, supra note 64, at 369. 
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cal, picky, and amorphous statutory reform has been proposed which oper-
ates at the periphery of the matter and leaves the most difficult questions to 
the agencies that implement the law.”206 
In reading this Part of the Article, the following question may have 
arisen: where is the counter-rhetoric by environmental interests groups and 
liberals? Part V will provide the contours of that counter-rhetoric before 
going on to examine how well the Executive Branch has taken its cues 
from Congress. 
V.  THE COUNTER-RHETORIC AGAINST “ROLLBACKS” 
Environmentalists and Democrats have countered the reformists’ 
rhetoric by characterizing the proposals as “rollbacks” of environmental 
protection.207 In many ways, one could say that the counter-rhetoric of 
“rollbacks” versus “reforms” has been successful in that Congress has been 
unable to weaken significantly species protection despite trying to for al-
most ten years. But several dangers lurk ahead for the environmental 
movement. One is the concern that its message is no longer appealing to 
the mainstream; instead these groups are viewed as extremists. The images 
of cuddly creatures such as the World Wildlife Foundation’s panda bear, or 
stately creatures such as the bald eagle, are fairing poorly against the con-
stant imagery of small landowners and simple communities caught in the 
crossfire between human development and species protection. Moreover, 
the Republican leadership has realized that wholesale reform will not be 
successful and has instead opted for more subtle changes that have enor-
mous potential. Representative Richard Pombo, chair of the House Re-
sources Committee says that he will no longer try to amend the Act in one 
sweeping piece of legislation, but instead will “break it down” one piece at 
a time.208 And unfortunately, it will be more difficult for environmental in-
terests groups to engage and impassion the public over changes that appear 
to be mostly procedural.209 
 
 206. Id. at 370. 
 207. E.g., Leshy, supra note 64, at 204; Joel Connelly, Environmental Groups Target Suburban 
Voters, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 29, 1998, at B1; Timothy Noah, GOP’s Rollback of the 
Green Agenda is Stalled by a Public Seeing Red Over Proposed Changes, WALL ST. J., DEC. 26, 1995, 
at A8. 
 208. Erica Werner, Endangered Species Act Targeted: House Resources Chairman Plans to ‘Break 
it Down’, WASH. POST, Jan.13, 2004, at A15. 
 209. See id. 
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A. The Environmental Interest Groups 
National environmental interest groups somehow arguably have be-
come known as extreme or largely irrelevant to the average citizen’s life. 
For example, one group of communications scholars analyzed the use of 
the term “tree-hugger” in newspapers in the spring of 1999210 and found 
that the use of the term may be characterized as “reduction to absurdity,”211 
making “environmentalists and their positions appear unrealistic and fool-
ish.”212 The term is used as “attack discourse”213 to ridicule214 and delegiti-
mize215 the movement and its advocates. The mental imagery of this term is 
too concrete216 and comical217 to be of great use to the environmental 
movement. As evidence of its extreme connotations, the term has been used 
as a rhetorical “moderating device,”218 according to this study, to define an 
advocate’s position as something less than radical.219 Indeed one conserva-
tive analyst offered that “‘environmentalists realize they are in a ghetto, 
and they are trying to figure out a way out of it,’ said Myron Ebell, an envi-
ronmental analyst at the conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute. 
‘They’re realizing that these things relate to people’s lives and not just 
wonky policy debates.’”220 
Against the Bush Administration, national environmental interest 
groups are coming on strong with the rhetoric, however. For example, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council’s report on the Bush Administration’s 
environmental policy characterized the administration as a greater threat 
than any posed since the advent of the environmental movement in 1970. 
“Environmental protections have been challenged before, most notably in 
the James Watt era and in the Newt Gingrich Congress, but never through a 
campaign as far-reaching and destructive as the threat posed today by the 
Bush Administration and the 108th Congress.”221 It is unclear whether this 
 
 210. Michael DeLoach, et al., An Analysis of the “Tree-Hugger” Label in ENVIROPOP 95, 96-97 
(Mark Meister & Phyllis M. Japp, eds. 2002). 
 211. Id. at 97. 
 212. Id. at 98. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 105. 
 215. Id. at 98. 
 216. Id. at 100. 
 217. Id. at 105. 
 218. Id. at 102. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Katharine Q. Seelye, Democratic Field Tries to Add Punch to Environment Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2003, at A22. 
 221. Robert Perks & Gregory Wetstone, Rewriting the Rules, Year-End Report 2002: The Bush 
Administration’s Assault on the Environment iv, at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/rollbacks/ 
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rhetoric will shift policy, but as a consultant for the Sierra Club who 
worked to counter some Republican rhetoric remarked, “‘It’s like a tennis 
game. The ball is back in our court, and we need to spend time and energy 
educating voters.’”222 
B. The Democratic Party 
The Democrats are realizing that to defend effectively against threats 
to species protection, they need to develop a framework for counter-
rhetoric and information. Professor Zygmunt Plater made the following ob-
servation with respect to public interest cases: “it ultimately is the public’s 
perception of the case that is the most important and determinative factor. 
What the public knows (or, significantly, does not know) of the case, ulti-
mately determines outcomes.”223 And arguably the same is true with re-
spect to legislation and policy. Some Democrats are forming “a political 
research institute in an effort to counter what they see as the domination of 
the national political debate by well-organized, well-financed conservatives 
at the White House, in Congress, and in a variety of media and policy insti-
tutes all over Washington.”224 As Carol Browner, EPA Administrator dur-
ing the Clinton Administration noted, “‘The conservative movement has 
been effective in building the echo chamber for themselves . . . both 
through the media—talk radio, Fox News, The Weekly Standard—and 
through effective institutions like the Heritage Foundation, which rein-
forces their ideas and focuses on communicating them.’”225 
Congressional Democrats are working to disseminate information 
about the Bush Administration’s environmental policies226 and the Depart-
ment of Interior’s record.227 The Democratic presidential candidates for the 
2004 election are changing their rhetoric as well to begin telling stories as 
 
execsum.asp (January 2003); see also The Bush Archives, at http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/ 
bush_archive.asp (last visited Feb. 20 2004) (criticizing the Bush Administration record on the 
environment); Green Peace at http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/index.fpl?article=422&object_id=8035 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (calling President Bush “The Toxic Texan”). 
 222. See Jennifer 8. Lee, A Call for Softer, Greener Language, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A24. 
 223. Plater, supra note 3, at 2. 
 224. Katharine Q. Seelye, Democrats, Seeing Dominance of Conservatives’ Message, Form Group 
to Fight It, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at A31. 
 225. Id. 
 226. United State House of Representatives, Comm. on Gov’t Reform – Minority Staff, Special 
Investigations Division, Politics and Science in the Bush Administration 2 at 
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf (Nov. 13, 
2003) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
 227. Democratic Staff of Comm. on Resources, Weird Science: The Interior Department’s Manipu-
lation of Science for Political Purposes at http://www.ourforests.org/weirdscience.pdf (Dec. 17, 2002) 
(Rep. Nick J. Rahall, Ranking Member). 
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opposed to referring to scientific data. For example, in support of air regu-
lations, they are talking about children with asthma, and with respect to the 
clean-up of hazardous waste they are pointing out that many more minori-
ties than whites live near toxic waste dumps.228 As former Governor of 
Vermont Dr. Howard Dean offered, “his fellow Democrats should speak 
concretely rather than in abstractions, and so link environmental problems 
with real-world consequences. Instead of talking about greenhouse gases,” 
Dr. Dean said, “they should talk about what it is like to take a child to the 
emergency room because of an asthma attack.”229 
“The Democrats old approach largely motivated a set of activists,” 
Mr. Podesta, said, but “hadn’t had as broad a reach as a voting issue into 
the general public.”230 As the Luntz memo points out, the term “environ-
mentalists” has a negative connotation,231 perhaps that of an activist, 
whereas “conservationists” are reasonable, moderate, and practical.232 De-
mocrats are now trying to extend their appeal to minorities, independents, 
and “queasy suburban Republicans.”233 Mr. Ebell of the Competitive En-
terprise Institute says that the Democratic message is “so shrill and so at 
odds with reality” that it does not resonate in states other than California, 
Massachusetts, and New York, states where Democrats already win.234 Jux-
taposing this rhetoric, the Bush Administration appears to be more intuitive 
and widely appealing, describing the plight of America as an entire coun-
try, not just those of small landowners. 
VI.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S RHETORIC 
Because the reform horror stories may support one political worldview 
or value system over another, their propagation also depends on the policy 
or rhetorical goals of an administration. These stories may take on an even 
broader sweep as they seek to define general principles of law. Examples 
from the current administration include Department of Interior Secretary 
Gale Norton’s 4Cs: “communication, consultation and cooperation, all in 
service of conservation.” This mantra is not about the ruination of one 
farmer or one small landowner but rather the destruction of whole commu-
 
 228. Seelye, supra note 220. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Luntz Memo, supra note 85, at 142, at http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/Luntz 
Research.Memo.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Seelye, supra note 220. 
 234. Id. 
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nities by insensitive legislators and bureaucrats.235 For example, rural 
ranching communities of the “Mountain West”236 have been held up as vic-
tims of environmental policies developed by federal officials who are char-
acterized by some as being unresponsive to local concerns.237 The popular 
conception is that environmental restrictions on extraction of natural re-
sources are strangling the economy through elimination of the region’s 
only high-wage jobs.238 The basic understanding is as follows: 
1.  Every economy has a base. 
2.  The Mountain West’s economic base is its natural resources industry, 
which is on the decline. 
3.  The Mountain West economy is on the decline.239 
Industry, politicians, and news media have painted a rather bleak picture of 
that regional economy.240 And what is rather clever about this story is that 
it turns private interests—those of the natural resources industry—into 
something that looks like a public interest—that of the entire region.241 
Two economists from the University of Montana, Thomas Michael Power 
and Richard N. Barrett, however, have researched and written extensively 
 
 235. But see P. Lynn Scarlett, A New Approach to Conservation: The Case for the Four CS, 17 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 73, 112 (2002) (arguing that the Dept. of the Interior is “developing a four 
Cs new environmentalism framework by exploring ways to . . . enhance landowner and other citizen 
participation in public land management decisions, to reduce procedural hurdles, and to dismantle bu-
reaucratic barriers.”). 
 236. The Mountain States are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming. BARRETT & POWER, supra note 87, at xvii. 
 237. See id. at 13, 17-18; See also 141 CONG. REC. S6339 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (char-
acterizing the ESA as pitting “working people” and “their families” against “uncompromising, intru-
sive, and unrelenting Federal mandates.”). 
 238. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 17-18; See also 141 CONG. REC. S7612 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Craig) (“The practice of forestry is at a standstill on our western public lands, and the 
primary culprit is the Endangered Species Act.”). 
 239. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 125. See also 141 Cong. REC. S6340 (1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Gorton) (explaining how the Service’s listing of the Northern Spotted Owl in 1989 as en-
dangered caused the following chain of events: a decline in timber industry, a rise in unemployment, 
families falling apart, an increase in divorce and domestic violence, “skyrocking” use of foodbanks, a 
rise in sale of homes, and ultimately “once proud, and productive members of our society . . . be-
com[ing] society’s burden.”). 
 240. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 133-34; See e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S6340 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Gorton). 
 241. See POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 125-26. Power and Barrett define “cowboy eco-
nomics” as the conventional understanding of the regional economy that is at odds with the reality of 
our national market economy and how it effects regional economies. Id. at xix. Their book is an attempt 
to provide a more accurate view, that is, “post-cowboy economics.” Id. at xix-xx. See also 141 CONG. 
REC. S6340 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (focusing on the plight of “timber communities,” family, 
and individuals rather than the timber companies). 
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to try to debunk this myth.242 Images of open-pit mines, farms, and ranches, 
however, distort the communities’ understanding of its current and evolv-
ing economic base. New jobs are found in small firms and anonymous of-
fice buildings, not out on the range.243 Moreover, these economists argue 
that not only is the story inaccurate in saying that environmental law detri-
mentally affects the region’s economy, but environmental law actually 
“enhances welfare and protects the very source of economic vitality that the 
Mountain West enjoys.”244 Despite this research to the contrary, the Bush 
Administration forges ahead with stories about the need to balance the en-
vironment and the economy, and accordingly promotes such programs as 
Clear Skies and Healthy Forests. 
A. Clear Skies, Healthy Forests, and other Euphemisms 
In 2002, the White House launched two environmental initiatives: 
Clear Skies245 and Healthy Forests.246 President Bush described the Clear 
Skies legislation as a new approach “based on this common-sense idea: that 
economic growth is key to environmental progress, because it is growth 
that provides the resources for investment in clean technologies.”247 He 
touted this program as combining “the power of markets, the creativity of 
entrepreneurs, and . . . the best scientific research.”248 According to Presi-
dent Bush, the proposed legislation would “dramatically reduce the three 
most significant forms of pollution from power plants, sulfur dioxide, ni-
trogen oxides and mercury.”249 
Environmental groups,250 Democratic presidential candidates, and oth-
ers251 quickly criticized the plan as a mere weakening of the Clean Air Act. 
 
 242. POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 133-34; See e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S6340 (1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Gorton). 
 243. POWER & BARRETT, supra note 87, at 131. 
 244. Id. at xix. Though salaries may be low compared to other regions of the country, the amenities 
are high and attract many of the new residents of the region. See id. at xviii, 17-18. 
 245. Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 485, 108th Cong. (2003); Clear Skies Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
 246. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 1904, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 247. George W. Bush, President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives, Ad-
dress at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland (Feb. 14, 2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See, e.g., The Bush Administration’s Air Pollution Plan, at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/ 
qbushplan.asp (Sept. 5, 2003) (describing the initiative as the “misnamed ‘Clear Skies’ initiative, which 
would gut existing health protections and do nothing to curb global warming”). 
 251. See, e.g., Empty Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A28; Patrick Leahy, President Bush’s 
‘Clear Skies’ Plan Would Hurt Northeast Most of All, at http://leahy.senate.govpress/200204/ 
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For example, the Sierra Club described the initiative as “a smokescreen for 
more pollution.”252 And presidential candidate Reverend Al Sharpton de-
scribed the Clear Skies proposal as being nothing more than a gift from 
President Bush to his corporate supporters.253 
The Healthy Forests Initiative has not faired much better among those 
groups. This initiative was billed as making our forests “healthy” by thin-
ning undergrowth and brush to prevent forest fires.254 Touring an area se-
verely damaged by forest fires, President Bush stated, “[t]oo many com-
munities like this have known too many hardships that fire causes . . . . 
We’ve got a problem in the country, a problem which has built up over 
decades and a problem we’d better fix before more people go through the 
grief the people of Summerhaven have gone through.”255 
Some environmentalists called President Bush’s Healthy Forests Ini-
tiative the “Horizontal Forest Initiative” because it is less about “fuel re-
duction”—the process of reducing forest material that could fuel a fire—
than about catering to the timber industry.256 The new legislation provides 
federal money for commercial logging in national forests,257 but it does not 
provide any money for fuel reduction on private land “where it is needed to 
safeguard commercial and residential development.”258 Moreover, Repre-
sentative Jay Inslee of Washington State criticized the legislation as not 
providing enough money to the Forest Service. Without more money, he 
says, the Forest Service will have a greater incentive to allow the logging 
of more valuable old-growth stands in order to pay for the thinning.259 
Similarly, “[e]nvironmental groups contend that the legislation will enable 
timber companies to log healthy trees and will not do enough to reduce the 
 
042202c.html (“The Administration’s ‘Clear Skies’ initiative is more fitting for April Fool’s Day than 
for Earth Day.”) (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). 
 252. President Bush’s New “Clear Skies” Proposal: A Smokescreen for More Pollution, at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/clear_skies.asp (Feb. 22, 2002). 
 253. Seelye, supra note 220. 
 254. George W. Bush, President Announces Healthy Forest Initiative, Remarks by the President on 
Forest Health and Preservation, The Compton Arena, Central Point, Oregon (Aug. 22, 2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020822-3.html. 
 255. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Promotes Healthy Forests in Ari-
zona (Aug. 11, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030811-4.html . 
 256. Healthy Forests: Proposal More Logging Bill than Forest Fire Prevention, HOUS. CHRON. 
Aug. 14, 2003, at 32A. 
 257. Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, § 108, 117 Stat. 1887 (2003). 
 258. Healthy Forests: Proposal More Logging Bill than Forest Fire Prevention, HOUS. CHRON., at 
32A. See also Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Flies over Fire Site to Promote ‘Healthy Forests’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2003, at A10 (quoting president of Wilderness Society who charges that initiative does noth-
ing to make people safer). 
 259. Mike Soraghan, Forest-thinning Funds Modest Plan Called Thrifty; Dems Cry Sellout, DENV. 
POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at A4. 
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fire danger to homes. ‘There’s a real danger that the president’s pen might 
as well be a chainsaw,’ said Amy Mall, a forest specialist with the Natural 
Resources Defense Council.”260 Or as one resource conservation professor 
described the situation, “[t]his is like letting the fox guard the henhouse.”261 
One such unlikely protector of listed species is Secretary Norton.262 She too 
has a story to tell. 
B. The Four C’s or the Three M’s? 
Secretary Norton explains her approach to regulation as the “4 C’s”: 
communication, consultation and cooperation, all in service of conserva-
tion. She believes that the agency should be considering more “the role 
nonregulatory conservation—the willing partnerships between citizens and 
all levels of government—can play.”263 In an op-ed regarding the protection 
of wetlands, Norton extolled the virtues of partners programs through 
which the federal government provides funds and technical assistance to 
individuals and groups to rehabilitate wetlands.264 However, Secretary Nor-
ton is not without her critics. 
Some of her critics call Norton’s signature phrase the “Three M’s: 
maddening, meaningless mantra.”265 Though her words may appear uncon-
troversial and daresay enchanting, they are stirring up considerable opposi-
tion. This language has softened what is perceived by environmentalists as 
the Bush Administration’s attack on the environment. Advised by a party 
strategist, Republican politicians have changed their rhetorical approach 
with respect to environmental issues to appeal to suburban voters.266 As the 
 
 260. Elizabeth Shogren & Richard Simon, New Forest-Thinning Policy Drops Safeguard for Wild-
life, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A19. 
 261. Michael Hill, The Political Environment, BALT. SUN, Dec. 14, 2003 at 1C (quoting Sandy 
Parker of the Department of Geography and Environmental Systems at the University of Maryland, Bal-
timore County). 
 262. See e.g., Michael Powell, The Westerner’s Interior Motives; To Gale Norton, Ranchers and 
Environmentalists Don’t Have to Be at Loggerheads, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001, at C1 (describing 
Gale Norton as a “rebel occup[ying] the palace” and a “Western politician who waged a decades-long 
war against the distant bureaucracies at Interior, one of those conservatives who fancy themselves guer-
rilla fighters against Washington’s command-and-control regimens.”); Douglas Jehl, Transition in 
Washington: The Interior Department; Interior Choice Faces Sharp Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2001, at A30 (discussing the advertisement, paid for by a coalition of eighteen environmental groups, 
which describes Gale Norton as “‘so far on the fringe’ that ‘she’s off the page’” and stating “‘America 
deserves an interior secretary who will protect our air, water and natural resources not the polluters who 
seek to exploit them’”). 
 263. Gale Norton & Ann Veneman, There’s More than One Way to Protect Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2003, at A25. 
 264. Id. 
 265. John Tierny, Trying for Balance at Interior, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A26. 
 266. See Lee, supra note 222. 
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president of the Environmental Working Group noted with respect to the 
Bush Administration, “They are showing the message discipline they need 
to get these anti-environmental policies past suburban voters.”267 
Below, this Article attempts to flesh out the contours of Norton’s phi-
losophy and to determine what is lurking behind it. Though public explana-
tions of this philosophy are scant at best,268 the Department of Interior’s ac-
tions speak louder than any slogan its chief administrator may chant. 
1. Communication 
Secretary Norton says that she is working to change the tone of politi-
cal discussions regarding environmental protection. She opines that “[t]oo 
often political conversation becomes bitter and divisive.269 Too often the 
casualties of this culture of partisan conflict are the very creatures and 
places that both sides are seeking to defend.”270 She believes that the fed-
eral government should be communicating with local property owners, 
elected officials, and others whose lives would be affected by federal ac-
tion.271 Here the idea is that local expertise will lead to solutions that are 
better than those emanating from administrators and theorists in Washing-
ton, DC.272 
Perhaps the Department of Interior plans to follow EPA’s lead in this 
area. EPA had increased the quantity and quality of information available 
to the public.273 Yet critics of EPA’s approach say that these programs are 
just an attempt to improve public relations and not meaningful involvement 
or participation by the public.274 Currently, the Department of Interior has 
no formal or specific mechanism for fostering the type of communication 
that Norton advocates. 
 
 267. Id. But see Christie Whitman, The Vital Republican Center, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at A19 
(“Some Republican consultants say that since we’re not going to win the votes of environmentalists 
anyway, we needn’t worry about what they think. Yet there are plenty of voters who care about the en-
vironment, even if it’s not the first thing they mention in polls.”). 
 268. Scarlett, supra note 235, at 74 (explaining that the “4Is”—innovation, incentives, information, 
and integrated-decision-making—gird the 4Cs). 
 269. Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the National News-
paper Association (Mar. 23, 2001), at http://www.doi.gov./news/010323.html. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See Scarlett, supra note 235, at 76. 
 273. See J. Charles Fox, A Real Public Role, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 19-20. In 
2003, EPA issued a new “Public Involvement Policy.” 69 Fed. Reg. 33,946 (June 6, 2003). The 
guidance for implementing this policy can be found at http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/ 
policy2003/guidance.pdf (May 2003). See generally the EPA’s website regarding public involvement at 
http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/ (last updated Mar. 9, 2004). 
 274. Lisa Pelstring, Good Start, Long Way To Go, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 22-23. 
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Despite this call for greater local involvement, environmentalists criti-
cize, for example, Norton’s new policy that prevents the Bureau of Land 
Management from protecting 600,000 acres in Colorado that Representa-
tive Diana DeGette has proposed to be designated as wilderness.275 The 
policy is the result of settlement with the state of Utah, yet it was developed 
without public input.276 Conservationists are essentially arguing that Norton 
selectively applies her 4C’s philosophy in similar situations. Some com-
munities have been allowed to participate while others have not.277 Though 
on the one hand the Bush Administration seems to have signaled that it will 
listen to local governments and user groups in way that the Clinton Ad-
ministration did not,278 critics are concerned that the Bush Administration’s 
actions may be designed to shut out some voices while privileging others. 
Also, the Bush Administration’s efforts to “streamline” the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) convey quite a different message than 
its rhetoric about its desire to include the public in the decision-making 
process.279 In 2002, the CEQ created the NEPA Task Force to study how 
the processes of NEPA could be improved and modernized.280 “Republi-
cans and their allies say the drive to change NEPA is aimed at . . . making 
sure that agencies listen to the people and companies, who are most af-
fected by their decisions. ‘If we can streamline NEPA, we’re going to fi-
nally get many of these [logging] projects moving,’ said Tom Partin of the 
Oregon-based American Forest Resource Council,”281 a trade association 
for timber interests.282 However, critics argue that the Task Force’s actual 
goal is to limit public access to environmental policymaking and informa-
tion.283 As Carl Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club, contends, 
“[t]he administration knows that if it can get the public out of the process 
the power relationships will change, and then they’ll be able to change the 
policy.”284 
 
 275. Theo Stein, BLM Planning Effort Lauded: Interior Chief Says Colorado Canyons Process 
Successful, DENV. POST, July 6, 2003, at A-24. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 279. Id. 
 280. 67 Fed. Reg. 45,510 (July 9, 2002). 
 281. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 282. “The American Forest Resource Council strives to provide a positive operating environment 
for the forest products community, representing nearly 100 forest product manufacturers and forest 
landowners—from small, family-owned companies to large multi-national corporations—in twelve 
states, west of the Great Lakes.” American Forest Resource Council, at http://www.afrc.ws/ (last visited 
Feb. 29, 2004). 
 283. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 284. Id. 
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One of the suggestions for streamlining the process is directing agen-
cies to create more categorical exclusions—using broad criteria—for pro-
jects that do not significantly impact the environment to give the agencies 
greater flexibility in determining which actions would require an Environ-
mental Impact Statement.285 Although CEQ Chairman James Connaughton 
said that they were working towards a more timely and collaborative proc-
ess that is therefore more efficient,286 some environmentalists such as an 
attorney for the National Resources Defense Council respond that “[t]heir 
focus is on speed rather than on meaningful public participation and envi-
ronmental review.”287 
“This administration has actively supported greatly expanding the list of 
activities that would be put in this category because once it’s in this 
category you don’t have the ‘nuisance’ of public participation,” said 
‘Robert B. Smythe, an environmental consultant and White House offi-
cial in the Ford and Carter administrations. “The language appears to 
provide some basis for reopening the question of categorical exclusions 
without any substantive justification.”288 
2. Consultation 
Though generalized accounts of what Norton means by “consultation” 
are elusive, with respect to the ESA she appears to be referring to the ex-
pansion of the section 7 process by having the Service “consult” with pri-
vate landowners as well as federal agencies. The current provisions of the 
Act only require consultation with private landowners when there is a “fed-
eral nexus,” that meaning whenever an agency of the federal government 
must provide a permit, license, or other authorization for the development 
to proceed. Without consultation, a private landowner must satisfy the re-
quirements of section 10 with her own resources. 
Through the Consultation program, the Service works with private land-
owners and other non-Federal entities to develop Habitat Conservation 
Plans that authorize the incidental take of listed species. The HCP proc-
ess allows private economic development to proceed while promoting 
listed species conservation.289 
 
 285. The NEPA Task Force Report to the Council on Environmental Quality, Modernizing NEPA 
Implementation at 57-63 (Sept. 2003), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/report/; John Heilprin, En-
vironmental Study Exemption Recommended/Report also Calls for New Rules for Managing Natural 
Resources, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2003, at A2; Michael Burnham, Regulations: CEQ Panel Suggests 
Measures for Reforming Environmental Review Process, GREENWIRE, Sept. 24, 2003, at 2. 
 286. John Heilprin, supra note 285. 
 287. Burnham, supra note 287. 
 288. Eric Pianin, Panel Backs Faster Environment Review, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003 at A31. 
 289. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10. 
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Through a policy initiative, the Service is able to accomplish what the 103d 
Congress could not accomplish.290 For example, in 1993 Senator Kemp-
thorne proposed a bill that would allow any person—even in the absence of 
a “federal nexus”—to initiate consultation with the Secretary if that person 
thought her activities could have an effect on a listed species.291 The poten-
tial benefits of invoking section 7, as discussed in Part II.C supra, include 
that the Secretary must act on the petition within ninety days,292 whereas 
under section 10, there is no limit to the amount of time the Secretary may 
take to review an incidental take permit application.293 
The proposed bills and Norton’s new policy of offering the potential 
benefits of consultation were designed to address the criticism that the bur-
dens associated with preparing an HCP under section 10 overwhelm all but 
the largest of landowners.294 Yet despite the numerous accounts that the 
current HCP process fails small landowners, John Sawhill, former Presi-
dent and CEO of The Nature Conservancy, painted a slightly different pic-
ture when faced with the question of whether section 10 is a viable option 
for small landowners. He argued that: 
Carried out as Congress intended, . . . the Section 10(a) process is a vi-
able option for small private landowners . . . For example the 
[RHCP] . . . [for Austin,] Texas, has been proven through several de-
tailed economic studies to be the most economical alternative for private 
landowners in a setting where many are vying for land development 
permits. Not only is it more efficient than every individual attempting to 
comply with the ESA alone under any mechanism, but also the unit cost 
of compliance is dramatically reduced. The official economic study . . . 
showed that participation in the plan by small landowners reduced their 
financial obligation of compliance by 85%.295 
It may be true that the American public wishes to pay more of the cost of 
species protection on private lands by expanding the applicability of sec-
 
 290. See, e.g., Endangered Species Reform Act of 1995, S. 768, 104th Cong, §§ 401-06 (1995); 
Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 199, H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. § 203; The 
Endangered Species Act Procedural Reform Amendments of 1993, H.R. 1490, 103d Cong. § 108 
(1993). 
 291. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1995, S. 1364, 104th Cong. § 12(a) (1994). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Sugges-
tions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 398 (1986) (stating that studies for all but 
the smallest HCPs require several months or years to complete before an HCP can be finalized). 
 294. See, e.g., The Role of Habitat Conservation Hearing, supra note 55, at 79 (“The current sec-
tion 10 process is not a viable option for the ‘little guy.’ The costs, time requirements, and uncertainties 
of section 10 HCPs prohibit most landowners from using them.”) (testimony of Ed Sauls, The Sauls 
Company & member, National Association of Homebuilders). Interestingly, this criticism is often 
launched by representatives of large landowners. 
 295. Id. at 49-60. 
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tion 7. No consensus has arisen in Congress, however, and the agency has 
not provided the public with a formal opportunity to comment on the ex-
pansion. Instead the agency has taken the lead in effect to amend the Act, 
without any of the Constitutional safeguards associated with lawmaking. 
Contrast this initiative to increase consultation with private landown-
ers with the Bush Administration’s move to eliminate consultation with 
agencies under certain circumstances. For example, in December 2003, the 
Services along with the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park 
Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forest Service (“Action 
Agencies”) issued joint “counterpart” consultation regulations.296 These 
regulations provide an “optional alternative” to the existing consultation 
process for agency projects that support the National Fire Plan (“NFP”) un-
der the Healthy Forests Initiative.297 The optional alternative “eliminates 
the need to conduct informal consultations and eliminates the requirement 
to obtain a written concurrence from the Service for those NFP actions that 
the Action Agency determines are ‘not likely to adversely affect’ 
(“NLAA”) any listed species or designated critical habitat.”298 These regu-
lations are intended to accelerate the rate at which the Action Agencies 
may implement their responsibilities under the NFP.299 What is significant 
about the alternative is that if the Action Agency has entered into an “Al-
ternative Consultation Agreement”, it may make an NLAA determination 
without consultation with or concurrence of the Service.300 
There were many criticisms of the rule when it was proposed and they 
included three general categories of concerns: urgency, expertise, and cap-
ture. Commenters on the proposed ruled expressed doubt about the need to 
accelerate the current process301 and suggested that rather than delegating 
authority to the Action Agencies, the Service could shorten the timeline for 
formal consultations and biological opinions.302 Another critique of this 
delegation was that the Action Agencies lacked the requisite expertise.303 
And finally opposition arose from the concern that the Action Agencies’ 
missions differ from that of the Services and thus the Action Agencies 
 
 296. Counterpart Regulations for Implementing the National Fire Plan, 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.31-.34 
(2004). 
 297. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 
68,254-02, 68,255 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 298. Id. at 68,254-02. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Counterpart Regulations for Implementing the National Fire Plan, 50 C.F.R. § 402.33 (2004). 
 301. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 
68,258-02 (Dec. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 302. Id. at 68,260. 
 303. Id. at 68,258. 
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would be less sensitive to protection of listed species and critical habitat. 
Moreover, commenters speculated that the alternative would give industry 
“free reign” to increase timber sales on public lands in a manner that is not 
in the best interest of the public.304 The current consultation process was 
seen as part of the “checks and balances inherent in the Act.”305 This new 
regulation did not receive much media attention,306 though its ramifications 
could be significant. 
Receiving more media attention, however, was the Service’s promul-
gation in August 2004 of counterpart consultations with EPA and the De-
partment of Agriculture with respect to pesticides for actions taken under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.307 These regula-
tions provide two optional alternatives.308 The first is similar to the Decem-
ber 2003 regulation in that it allows EPA to make NLAA determinations 
without consultation with or concurrence from the Service.309 Criticisms 
were likewise similar.310 The second alternative is the “new optional formal 
consultation process.”311 It is optional in that EPA decides whether to initi-
ate formal consultation by submitting a written request along with an “ef-
fects determination” to the Service.312 In conducting this consultation, the 
Service may adopt EPA’s findings with respect to the ecological effects of 
pesticides without issuing its own independent biological opinion.313 
Despite these formal changes, it is unclear that the review of pesti-
cides will be more or less protective of listed species and their habitats be-
cause in the past EPA “frequently failed” to consult with the Service with 
 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. A search of Westlaw’s ALLNEWS database and Lexis’ Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers 
database yielded no mainstream articles on this regulation. 
 307. E.g., Juliet Eilperin, EPA Will Not Have to Consult Wildlife Agencies on Pesticides, WASH. 
POST, July 30, 2004, at A07; John Heilprin, EPA Eases Rule Approving Pesticides, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
July 30, 2004, at 34. The Services receive more than 50,000 comments on the NFP rule, Joint Counter-
part Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68 F.R. 68,259, 68,257 (Dec. 8, 2003) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) but more than 125,000 on the pesticide rule, Joint Counterpart En-
dangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,732, 47,740 (Aug. 5, 2004) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 308. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 
47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 309. Counterpart Regulations Governing Actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 50 C.F.R. § 402.45 (2004). 
 310. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 
47,732, 47,740-57 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
 311. Counterpart Regulations Governing Actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 50 C.F.R. § 402.46 (2004). 
 312. Id. § 402.46(a). 
 313. Id. § 402.46(c)(i). 
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respect to new pesticides.314 The agencies completed only a dozen consulta-
tions in the last decade.315 The rationale for the failure to comply with the 
Act was that the consultations would have been too complex.316 Rather than 
comply with existing law, the Service justifies these regulations by stating 
that the process needs to be streamlined, the Action Agencies have the req-
uisite expertise, and the Service will maintain oversight.317 Despite EPA’s 
expertise with respect to pesticides, critics challenge its expertise with re-
spect to the Endangered Species Act. As an attorney for Earthjustice 
quipped, “‘If you take the experts out of the room because you don’t like 
what they’re saying, that’s one way to streamline the registration of dan-
gerous pesticides’ . . . .”318 An attorney for the Natural Resources Defense 
Council objected to the new regulation arguing that complexity counsels in 
favor of more protection of listed species and their habitats, not less protec-
tion.319 
The consultation process has played a crucial role in the regulation of 
agency action. Section 7 is the “institutionalization” of caution.320 Tradi-
tionally, the Services have relied upon the action agencies to notify them 
when an agency action might affect listed species and their habitats and to 
notify them early in the process. Without informal consultation, the Ser-
vices may be excluded from all but the major agency actions, and thus 
these new regulations have the potential to vitiate the prophylactic benefits 
of consultation. The regulations threaten to create a culture of willful igno-
rance. Though the Services may intervene and seek injunctive relief, they 
would not be able to until later in the planning and implementation of the 
agency actions upon somehow learning of likely adverse effects. Thus there 
exists greater potential for adverse impacts to listed species and their habi-
tats. 
3. Cooperation 
Secretary Norton is said to be emphasizing “cooperation at the local 
level rather than federal edicts.”321 What this policy translates into is less 
enforcement of federal law while “moving to impose regionally tailored 
policies that give much more deference to local industry and local commu-
 
 314. Eilperin, supra note 311. 
 315. Eilperin, supra note 311; Heilprin, supra note 311. 
 316. Heilprin, supra note 311. 
 317. See id. 
 318. Eilperin, supra note 311. 
 319. Heilprin, supra note 311. 
 320. H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., at 4-5 (1973). 
 321. John Tiery, Trying for Balance at Interior Dept., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A26. 
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nities.”322 As James Connaughton, chair of the CEQ, explained, “[w]hat 
we’ve changed is this idea that Northeasterners who don’t really know the 
West ought to be able to dictate how the West or the Midwest or anyplace 
else can best achieve environmental improvements.”323 Mr. Connaughton 
intimates that national environmental groups and cappuccino cowboys in 
the northeast have too much control over national environmental policy. 
However, laws are still passed by a representative body, i.e., Congress. The 
agencies, to the contrary, are marching to the steady cadence of the White 
House and perhaps are not giving due regard to those laws. Tailoring poli-
cies to meet regional needs has some common sense appeal; however, one 
of the bedrock principles of federal environmental law is that at some level 
there must be uniformity in order to accomplish the goals of environmental 
law.324 Congress has established the minimum level of protection and has 
not given the agencies the authority to change it. 
In keeping with the spirit of cooperation, President Bush issued an ex-
ecutive order in August 2004 directing the Department of Interior, among 
others, to “implement laws . . . in a manner that promotes cooperative con-
servation, with an emphasis on appropriate inclusion of local participation 
in Federal decisionmaking.”325 Environmentalists have criticized the execu-
tive order as another attempt to deemphasize the role of the federal gov-
ernment in the management of public lands.326 The order also requires the 
Department to act in a manner that “takes appropriate account of and re-
spects the interests of persons with ownership or other legally recognized 
interests in land and other natural resources.”327 This language concerns 
environmentalists because it could lead the Department to privilege private 
property rights over public property rights.328 
And criticism of this cooperative approach comes from many different 
groups. Some libertarians are concerned that Norton spends so much time 
trying to cooperate with established interest groups such as environmental-
ists and miners that she is ignoring the free-markets principles with which 
she was so enamored previously.329 Some environmentalists have ex-
 
 322. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National Perspec-
tive) for Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POLY. F. 225, 251-91 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600-05 (1996). 
 325. Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989, 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004). 
 326. Dan Berman, Bush Orders Departments to Encourage Cooperation with Communities, States, 
GREENWIRE, Aug. 30, 2004. 
 327. Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989, 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004). 
 328. Berman, supra note 330. 
 329. Tierny, supra note 265. 
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pressed skepticism about this approach as well, arguing that the agency is 
actually only interested in cooperating with industry. 
Hogwash, say prominent conservationists. “This isn’t about empowering 
local communities, it’s about serving the Republicans’ core backers: the 
extractive industries and big manufacturers,” said Carl Pope, the long-
time executive director of the 700,000-member Sierra Club. “Bush cam-
paigned as a populist but he’s governing as a Whig. These guys think the 
sole proper function is to serve business.”330 
When confronted with such criticism, Norton points to the cooperative pro-
jects that the Department sponsors.331 For example, the Cooperative Con-
servation Initiative is comprised of many programs, including the Coopera-
tive Endangered Species Conservation Fund, the Landowner Incentive 
program, the Partners for Fish and Wildlife program, and the Private Stew-
ardship program.332 The Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation 
Fund provides funding under section 6 of the Act for states and territories 
to engage in species protection on non-federal land.333 In order to qualify 
for a grant under this program, the state or territory must enter into a “co-
operative agreement” with the Service.334 For fiscal year 2002-03, the Ser-
vice had approximately $80 million available for such grants.335 The Part-
ners for Fish and Wildlife program offers technical and financial assistance 
to private landowners who would like to restore wildlife habitat on their 
property.336 The Private Stewardship Program, with almost $10 million in 
funding for fiscal year 2002-03, provides grants to private entities involved 
in voluntary measures to protect listed, proposed, or candidate species.337 
 
 330. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 331. Tierny, supra note 265. 
 332. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 332. Four grants are available through this fund. The 
majority of the funds, $63.8 million or almost 79%, is designated for acquisition of land, with $51.1 
million for the fiscal year 2002-03 designated for HCP Land Acquisition Grants, which states and terri-
tories may use to purchase land associated with approved HCPs and $12.7 million for the Recovery 
Land Acquisition Grants, which they may use to purchase land in support of approved recovery plans 
for endangered or threatened species. States and territories may use the Conservation Grants, $7.5 mil-
lion to help conserve listed and at-risk species and the Habitat Conservation Planning Assistance 
Grants, $6.6 million, to develop HCPs. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Partnerships With States: 
Tools for Helping Communities and Landowners Conserve Species Habitat, at 
http://endangered.fws.gov/landowner/grants.pdf (March 2003). 
 336. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program—Our Partners, Goals 
and Accomplishments, at http://partners.fws.gov/old/What%20we%20do/overview.html (June 24, 
2002). Between 1987 and 2002, 27,000 landowners participated in this program. Scarlett, supra note 
235, at 75. 
 337. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 10. 
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a. Cooperation as Compensation 
Many members of Congress have tried unsuccessfully—session after 
session—to pass legislation to provide compensation for private landown-
ers whose development activities have been curtailed by operation of the 
Endangered Species Act. The stories of small landowners losing the ability 
to develop their land, however, lost considerable force as then Secretary 
Bruce Babbitt worked to make the Act more “flexible.” Under Babbitt, the 
Service increased its use of section 10, creating boilerplate HCPs for small 
landowners.338 The Service also developed the “No Surprises” policy to 
give assurances that once the Service issued an incidental take permit under 
section 10, very little, if anything, more would be required of the permittee 
even if circumstances regarding the listed species changed or later became 
known.339 Babbitt’s actions diffused the situation created by the private 
property rights activists and dissipated the political will to overhaul the 
Act.340 Though his actions were well-intentioned and likely meant to save 
the Act from what appeared to be its imminent demise, Part VII.B.1.b. of 
this Article critiques the “No Surprises” policy as successful in achieving 
its primary goal (calming the legislative rancor) but nonetheless misguided. 
Despite elimination of some of the most compelling arguments for 
compensation, the reformists still desired to compensate private landown-
ers. Although unable to amend the ESA directly, the reformers have been 
able to increase appropriations for certain aspects of the implementation of 
the Act. Raising the level of funding to the Service would seem neutral to 
positive for species protection, but the use of that funding in some pro-
grams rather than others may ignore the will of the public not to compen-
sate private landowners regardless of the size of their holdings. 
With Secretary Norton’s programs and the help of Congress’ appro-
priations, the Service is accomplishing now what Congress could not do on 
its own. The argument is that the most effective means for protecting listed 
species on private land is to provide landowners with financial incentives 
rather than penalties. In essence, the Service is choosing to pay landowners 
to comply with existing law. The Service is using existing mechanisms to 
administer these grants and some environmental interest groups have em-
 
 338. See Eric Pryne, A Tale of Two Tree Farmers-Specter of Law Causes One Man to Log Early, 
While Other Struggles to Conserve Habitat, SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 1995, at A1. See also Patrick A. 
Parenteau, Who’s Taking What? Property Rights, Endangered Species, and the Constitution, 6 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 619, 623 (1995). 
 339. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5) (2003). See also Patrick A. Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: 
Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY. 
REV. 227, 291-92 (1998). 
 340. Leshy, supra note 64, at 213-14. 
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braced these types of programs.341 At the same time, however, the Service 
is not requesting adequate funding to carry out its primary functions under 
the Act. 
b. Cooperation as Capture 
Norton says that the 4 C’s apply to relationships “[b]etween landown-
ers and environmentalists; between all levels of government and federal of-
ficials; between government leaders and the media; and between all the 
people of goodwill who share the common goal of protecting our wild 
places and the habitat[s] that surround them.”342 Yet, there is much debate 
concerning the wisdom of these collaborative efforts.343 The criticism that 
EPA faced several years ago could apply with equal force to Norton’s ap-
proach. EPA began to engage more frequently in negotiated rulemaking344 
and to develop programs similar to the Common Sense Initiative345 and 
Project XL.346 Critics of these programs suggest that these approaches lead 
to under-representation of certain groups, which then leads to decisions that 
reflect the desires of the most powerful and well-connected among the 
stakeholders.347 Thus true consensus may never be reached. 
Moreover, consensus can also hamstring efforts toward real solutions. 
As one commentator discussed with respect to water disputes in the West— 
[W]e abdicate our ability to make something happen whenever an out-
spoken, insistent minority does not want it. Another pernicious result is 
that we waste tons of money on solutions everyone can buy into but 
achieve little. Consensus-seeking makes us all feel good. But, in Marga-
ret Thatcher’s apt phrase, it is another term for lack of leadership; it 
 
 341. See generally Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and the Restruc-
turing of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 692 (1999) (discussing the evolv-
ing role of non-profit organizations in partnership agreements between private entities and govern-
ments). 
 342. Norton, supra note 269. 
 343. Compare Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy: Government-
Business Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10891 (2001) with Michael 
McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, at 
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 (May 13, 1996). 
 344. For a general discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of negotiated rulemakings, see Richard 
B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001). 
 345. 59 Fed. Reg. 57,178 (Nov. 14, 1994) (proposing plan for EPA to work with outside groups to 
find less expensive means to produce a cleaner environment). 
 346. See e.g., Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making it Legal, Making it Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL 
L.J. 399 (1998) (describing Project XL and the barriers to its success). 
 347. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 343; see also Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of 
Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 74 (2000) 
(proposing something short of the collaborative governance model). 
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means you must accept minority tyranny over majority will whenever an 
implacable few have gummed the works.348 
Furthermore, these collaborative efforts may provide an opportunity for 
“collusion” or some heightened version of “agency capture.”349 Collusion 
will occur because agencies may be tempted to strike bargains with repeat 
players without giving proper attention to the larger public interest. Also, 
negotiations naturally will tend to favor the more powerful groups. These 
repeat players will also take on the mantle of authority and may not ade-
quately disclose their “rational self-interest.” Often, the most powerful 
group will be industry and if its positions prevail, it can be argued that en-
vironmental standards inevitably will be weakened. While such dangers 
may already exist, the potential for problems will only increase as agencies 
steer in the direction of a more collaborative model of rulemaking. 
In addition, a greater degree of subdelegation can be expected as a re-
sult of this move toward collaboration. Subdelegation occurs when an 
agency delegates some of its statutory responsibilities to another entity.350 
The agencies are not only shouldering more responsibility with respect to 
lawmaking, but they are now faced with the limiting legislation that was 
enacted in fulfillment of the Contract with America. For example, legisla-
tion such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995351 placed greater 
analytic demands on agencies requiring more extensive cost-benefit analy-
sis and risk assessment, as well as adding the burden of reporting to various 
administrative arms of Congress. At the same time, the White House con-
tinues to heap new requirements on the agencies. And because of the limbo 
that the Act has been in since its last authorization, the agencies have not 
been provided with adequate resources to implement these demands. Ac-
cordingly, agencies can be expected to welcome the opportunity to reallo-
cate regulatory responsibility to private entities, a delegation of power that 
was not authorized by Congress or the voters. 
Norton, however, cannot be credited or blamed for initiating this ap-
proach to the enforcement of natural resources law. Former Secretary 
Bruce Babbitt was also interested in pursuing alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Babbitt described what he and his agency were doing as “an 
 
 348. Marc Reisner, The New Water Agenda: Restoration, Deconstruction, and the Limits to Con-
sensus, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (2000). 
 349. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
83-87 (1997). 
 350. See generally Allyson Barker, et al., The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land Re-
source Management: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67 (2003) (discussing 
subdelegation doctrine). 
 351. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-71 (2000). 
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entirely extralegal process in which stakeholders are convened.”352 Babbitt 
admitted that this “extralegal, extra-constitutional body” may not be what it 
ought to be, but he thought it was the only mechanism working in the coun-
try at the time.353 
VII.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S INITIATIVES 
The role of the Executive Branch has shifted noticeably with respect 
to the Endangered Species Act since the Contract with America. While nei-
ther Congress nor the courts have advanced significantly the positions of 
various stakeholders, the Department of Interior and the White House have 
been working diligently to do so.354 As Former Secretary Bruce Babbitt ex-
plained, “[w]hat we’re doing is effectively what Congress used to do. We 
are resolving disputes, creating administrative law, legislating and appro-
priating. Now how do we do that outside the normal circle of our institu-
tions?”355 In essence, the Department of Interior was exceeding the scope 
of its authority under the Act and the U.S. Constitution. This trend contin-
ues with the Bush Administration. 
Business leaders are pleased with the direction the administration is 
moving with respect to agency action. For example, the vice president for 
environmental policy of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce explained, “‘I’m 
very optimistic’ . . . . ‘I think we’re going to see a lot of changes that are 
friendly to business, and a lot of that is going to happen in the agencies. 
They’re going to make a lot of headway.’”356 Unfortunately, that headway 
likely will be made “outside the limelight,”357 and yet these changes are ter-
ribly disquieting. As a review of the Bush Administration’s track record 
with regard to wilderness and wildlife points out, 
the Bush Administration’s approach . . . has generally not involved the 
outright declaration of anti-conservation policy objectives. Instead, the 
 
 352. Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Decisions Are Made, in 
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR, 13, 14 
(CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation), Vol. 19, No. 1, 
Jan. 2001 [hereinafter Babbitt, ADR Concepts]; see also Bruce Babbitt, Remarks to the Society of Range 
Management, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 399, 401 (1994) (“These new groups bring together ranchers, 
environmentalists and interested citizens to meet over coffee at the kitchen table and out on the range to 
listen to each other to develop mutual confidence and to search for consensus in solving public land 
issues.”). 
 353. Babbitt, ADR Concepts, supra note 352, at 15. 
 354. See id. at 14 (discussing congressional abdication and the failures of courts). 
 355. Id. at 14-15. 
 356. Fagin, supra note 195. 
 357. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Nature of the Beast: An Introduction to the Issue, 33 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 333, 336-37 (2003) (describing how George W. Bush’s Administration has “quietly” backed 
away from the Clinton Administration’s direction). 
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administration’s public pronouncements have continued to stress the im-
portance of protecting wilderness areas and endangered species. Not-
withstanding these pronouncements, however, significant changes appear 
to be afoot. Through the settling of industry-initiated lawsuits against 
federal agencies, unannounced shifts in internal agency policy, and dis-
cretionary inaction on proposals inherited from the Clinton Administra-
tion, President George W. Bush has quietly set a new course for wilder-
ness and wildlife policy.358 
That course has been set in part by encouraging agencies to develop “a 
smarter regulatory process based on sound science and economics: a 
smarter process adopts new rules when market and local choices fail, modi-
fies existing rules to make them more effective or less costly and rescinds 
outmoded rules whose benefits no longer justify their costs.”359 From the 
economics standpoint, the administration is expanding upon an Executive 
Order issued by former President Bill Clinton.360 Under this order, an 
agency must assess the costs and benefits of proposed regulation and only 
propose the regulation if its benefits justify the costs.361 If an agency pro-
poses “significant regulatory action,” it must provide OMB with additional 
information regarding the costs and benefits expected from the regulatory 
action and the costs and benefits of any feasible alternatives.362 In 2003 
OMB provided guidance to the agencies on how to develop the required 
“regulatory analysis,” with the bulk of it being cost-benefit analysis.363 
The administration has also issued the rallying cry for the use of 
“sound science” in regulatory decisionmaking. “Ours is going to be an ad-
ministration that makes decisions on science, what’s realistic, common-
sense decisions.”364 This approach intentionally and unintentionally can 
 
 358. Id. 
 359. Graham, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
 360. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (seeking 
to “reform and make more efficient the regulatory process”). 
 361. Id. (“Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation 
and . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the in-
tended regulation justify its costs.”). 
 362. Id. 
 363. OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, Sept. 17, 2003 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter OMB Circular A-4]. In the event that agencies do not follow this 
guidance, OMB is using what is known as the “dreaded return letter” and other forms of persuasion. 
Graham, supra note 2. The return letter is one that OMB may use to “return” a proposed rule to an 
agency for reconsideration if OMB makes any number of determinations, including that the quality of 
the agency’s analysis is unacceptable or the standards adopted are not supported by the analysis. John 
D. Graham, Memorandum for the President’s Management Council re Presidential Review of Agency 
Rulemaking by OIRA, at 6 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-38-attach.pdf. (Sept. 20, 
2001) (emphasis added). 
 364. Press Release, White House, Press Conference by the President (Mar. 29, 2001) at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html. 
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lead to intolerable delays or even “analysis paralysis” wherein the agency 
undertakes to study and restudy issues such that no action is ever taken. 
Thus, this call for sound science may be little more than an elaborate, ex-
pensive delay tactic. 
Also “White House officials say ‘sound science’ fits with Bush’s mar-
ket-based approach to environmental protection. The administration says 
it’s possible to balance the need for biodiversity, clean air and clean water 
with economic growth, energy production and reduced regulation.”365 One 
market-based approach is the development of conservation banks for criti-
cal habitat.366 Another is the development of the “No Surprises” policy to 
provide an incentive for private landowners to protect listed species on 
their land. This policy, however, is in effect deregulation, exceeding the 
scope of the Department of Interior’s statutory authority. This part of the 
Article will explore the implications of these policies for species protection. 
A. The Problem with the ESA and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Quantifying the costs of compliance with existing law seems to be a 
practical idea. The costs of habitat conservation plans, mitigation measures, 
loss of intended economic use of land, etc., seem readily quantifiable. In-
deed, at first glance, such a requirement would appear to be a good, “com-
mon sense” policy to implement. But an examination of the goals and pro-
visions of the ESA call this common sense approach into question because 
one then must turn to the valuation of threatened and endangered species, 
critical habitat, and biodiversity. There’s the rub. Here policy-makers en-
counter the difficulty, the impossibility, or the folly of quantifying in dol-
lars the value of biodiversity. 
Some commentators suggest that environmentalists have evaded ques-
tions of efficiency and cost-benefit analyses,367 but environmentalists re-
spond that cost-benefit analysis ignores “important ‘noneconomic’ values 
or that economic analyses are inadequate means to evaluate decisions af-
 
 365. Julie Deardorff, The Politics of Nature; Bush Has Said his Environmental Strategies Won’t 
Harm Nature or Man—A Claim Some Doubt, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2003, at C1. 
 366. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation 
Banks 2-19 (May 2, 2003) at http://endangered.fws.gov/policies/conservation-banking.pdf. The De-
partment of Interior released guidance without a notice and comment period. Interior Department Is-
sues First Guidance on Conservation Banks for Habitat Protection, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES 
(BNA), No. 103, at A-26 (May 29, 2003). 
 367. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY 28-45 (1987); David 
Ehrenfeld, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?, in BIODIVERSITY 212, 214-15 (E.O. Wilson ed. 1988) 
(“The sad fact that few conservationists care to face is that many species, perhaps most, do not seem to 
have any conventional value at all, even hidden conventional value.”). 
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fecting the environment.”368 And in the attempted “translation” of these 
values into dollar values, we lose what is most important to us about the 
environment.369 Moreover, Federico Cheever argues that it is unwise to 
weigh the value of endangered listed species against the cost of their pro-
tection. “Once a species is perched on the brink of extinction, compromise 
becomes unacceptably dangerous; what may look like ‘reasonable’ ac-
commodation may lead to annihilation.”370 
Putting aside these criticisms of applying this analytic framework to 
decisions about endangered species, more difficulties remain. One such dif-
ficulty with quantification stems in part from the reasons for preserving 
biodiversity. There are a number of conceptual frameworks in this area that 
include distinguishing between anthropocentric and biocentric rationales,371 
demand values and transformative values,372 and utilitarian, esthetic, and 
ethical bases for preservation.373 Many of these reasons hinge upon specu-
lative calculations about what discoveries will or could be made in the fu-
ture which make quantification difficult.374 
Despite these limitations, many attempts have been made to quantify 
the value of preservation. The first and most obvious route for cost-benefit 
analysis is to attempt to assign some market value to the species. Yet many 
would argue that because no market exists for many species, cost-benefit 
analysis is not a rational decision-making tool.375 However, economists 
have made attempts to hypothesize a market for these species “by deter-
mining what the individual would be willing to pay . . . for an increment 
of . . . [the good] or what compensation the individual would be willing to 
 
 368. BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 340, at 28. 
 369. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 39-40 (2004). 
 370. Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedges, Lilies, Checker-
Mallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endangered Species 
Act is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 315 (1998). 
 371. See, e.g., PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE 44-53 (1986); TIMOTHY BEATLEY, 
ETHICAL LAND USE: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND PLANNING 6-9 (1994) (describing rationales as rang-
ing from utilitarian and instrumental views to those that focus upon the intrinsic or inherent value of 
other species). 
 372. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 367, at 6-14 (describing values we place on things 
we demand now versus values to be gained in the future because the existence of the thing and the ex-
perience of the thing transform us). 
 373. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diver-
sity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 269-75 (1991). 
 374. Congressional debates have touched upon this quandary in citing the example of the discovery 
of the medicinal value of the yew tree. 141 CONG. REC. S3576 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Boxer). 
 375. Cf. BRYAN G. NORTON, supra note 367, at 28. 
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accept as compensation for the decrement of it.”376 A number of criticisms 
have been launched against the use of this hypothetical or contingent valua-
tion, however.377 First, people’s expressed preferences, that is what they 
say they would do, often contradict their revealed preferences, what they 
have done.378 Also, the answers to questions about one’s willingness to pay 
or willingness to accept compensation vary with the structure of the sur-
vey.379 For example, the order of questions and reminders of budgetary 
constraints often change the responses.380 Furthermore, the amount people 
are willing to pay for preservation or to accept as compensation for degra-
dation does not move in a step-wise progression. Greater gains or losses are 
not matched by equal changes in amount of money to be paid or ac-
cepted.381 
Admittedly, OMB’s guidance to the agencies does acknowledge that 
some values may not be expressed in terms of monetary or physical units 
and that attempting to use cost-benefit analysis in those instances is “less 
useful” and “can even be misleading.”382 But more troubling is the ability 
of this requirement “to reorder agency priorities or to stall or foreclose 
some protective rulemakings,”383 despite recognition of its limitations. This 
policy objective mimics one important aspect of the various amendments 
proposed by Congress that would require agencies to engage in “takings 
impact analysis.”384 That proposed legislation would have required the U.S. 
Attorney General to certify that agency actions were in compliance with 
 
 376. Id. See also BEATLEY, supra note 371, at 50-52 (1994) (sampling various contingent valuation 
techniques). 
 377. See generally CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 
1993). 
 378. Peter Passell, Disputed New Role for Polls: Putting a Price Tag on Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 1993, at A1. 
 379. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contin-
gent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 879, 883 (1994) (“The bulk of the eco-
nomic debate regarding . . . [contingent valuations] has focused on the sensitivity of the results—or the 
lack thereof—to factors like the framing of questions, the means of conducting the survey . . . .”); 
ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: 
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 214-16 (1989) (discussing the affect of the survey instrument 
on reliability). 
 380. Passell, supra note 378. 
 381. See id. (citing a study which showed that the public was willing to spend the same amount to 
save 2,000; 20,000; and 200,000 migratory birds from oil-covered ponds). 
 382. OMB Circular A-4, supra note 363. 
 383. Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Sci-
ence in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 123 (2003). 
 384. E.g., Private Property Rights Act of 2001, S. 1412, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); Private Property 
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 212, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); Private Property Rights Act of 1999, S. 246, 
106th Cong § 5 (1999); Ominbus Property Rights Act of 1997, S. 781 105th Cong. § 403 (1997); 
Ominbus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 403 (1995). 
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Executive Order 12,630 or similar procedures to assess the potential for 
taking private property.385 Executive Order 12,630 required every agency to 
“identify the takings implications of proposed regulatory actions and ad-
dress the merits of those actions in light of the identified takings implica-
tions.”386 Supporters of such proposals believed that it would force bureau-
crats to address the government’s obligations under the Fifth Amendment 
rather than ignore them.387 On the other hand, these proposals were thought 
merely to have added another layer of bureaucracy to decision-making.388 
And self-interested parties could use them to delay governmental action 
that is considered to be desirable for the country.389 Indeed, rather than 
making government officials analyze the impact of their actions, the pro-
posed legislation perhaps was an attempt to frighten those officials away 
from performing their statutory obligations.390 As John Graham explains, 
OMB is “using both the carrot and the stick” so that “agencies are begin-
ning to invite OMB into the early stages of regulatory deliberations, where 
our analytical approach can have a much bigger impact.”391 And when in-
vited in, this administration has the opportunity to use the policy pro-
nouncement to excuse itself from implementing the Act as intended by 
Congress. Below is a discussion of how the Executive Branch may use 
cost-benefit analysis to abdicate its responsibilities under the Act for list-
ings and designations of critical habitat. 
1. Listing Species 
Environmental law is one of the few areas in which consideration of 
cost often is strictly prohibited.392 For example, with respect to listing deci-
sions, the ESA requires the Secretary to make those decisions “solely on 
 
 385. Private Property Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 212, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001). 
 386. Exec. Order 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
 387. Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 543 
(Spr. 2000). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 78-79 
(1996). 
 390. Compare Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187, 195 
(2000) (“Even there, however, the constitutional claim is more likely to be a threat used to intimidate 
the other side in negotiations.”), and Glenn P. Sugamel, “Takings” Bills Threaten People, Property, 
Zoning, and the Environment, 31 URB. LAW. 177, 193 (Spr. 1999) (arguing that property rights bills 
would allow developers to intimidate municipalities into approving inappropriate projects), with Daniel 
Pollak, Have the U.S. Supreme Court’s 5th Amendment Takings Decisions Changed Land Use Planning 
in California (California Research Bureau, California State Library), Mar. 2000, at 77-81 (reporting that 
while most municipalities surveyed did not make major changes in their regulation of land use, a sig-
nificant minority did report that they have changed their strategies). 
 391. Graham, supra note 2. 
 392. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). 
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the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to 
him . . . .”393 The plain language of this provision appears to bar absolutely 
consideration of the economic impacts of listing decisions, and thus con-
cern about the use of cost-benefit analysis may be misplaced. Yet, when 
one carefully examines the implementation of the Act as Oliver Houck has 
done, the provision’s language is no longer plain.394 In the context of what 
Houck describes as “exploitation of some very limited flexibility Congress 
provided for listing, and chronic resistance to the Act itself,”395 the De-
partment of Interior has made this and other provisions of the Act more 
discretionary than mandatory.396 
This discretion coupled with the cry for more cost-benefit analysis al-
lows the Service to slow down the listing process, and during this slow-
down more species become extinct. Given the statute’s language, it is 
unlikely that the Service will cite cost-benefit analysis as a reason for deny-
ing a petition to list a species or for refusing to take the initiative itself. But 
the force of this rhetoric could serve as a significant unspoken rationale of 
its decisions not to list, and as such may do violence to the “environmental 
ethics”397 underlying the statute. 
Consider the example of the northern spotted owl. Environmental 
groups sued the Department of Interior for its failure to list the northern 
spotted owl as threatened or endangered in the face of biological evidence 
of its endangerment.398 The listing decision may not have been problematic 
for the Secretary absent the requirements of section 4(a)(3). Section 4(a)(3) 
requires that the Secretary upon listing “to the extent prudent and determin-
able . . . designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to 
be critical habitat.”399 Only at this point, may the Secretary explicitly con-
sider the economic impact of her decisions. But with the need for economic 
analysis overshadowing implementation of the Act, the Secretary may be 
hesitant to carry out her obligations with respect to one portion of the Act 
because she does not wish to set into motion the seemingly non-
discretionary processes described below. The reformers worry that the Sec-
retary does not consider the socioeconomic impact of her determinations 
 
 393. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 394. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the 
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993). 
 395. Id. at 285. 
 396. See id. at 297 (stating that the Endangered Species Act permitting system is conducted 
“largely at the Department’s discretion”). 
 397. See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 65 
n.5 (2003) (defining “environmental ethics”). 
 398. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
 399. 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000). 
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thus setting the stage for inevitable political “train wrecks;”400 the conser-
vationists argue that the Secretary impermissibly takes into account the so-
cioeconomic impact of future determinations and thus lists an artificially 
low number of species to avoid political “train wrecks.”401 
2. Designating Critical Habitat 
As soon as the Secretary makes the initial decision to list a species, 
without factoring in economics, she appears to be required statutorily to 
take a number of non-discretionary actions. One of those is that the Secre-
tary is to concurrently with making the decision to list a species, to the ex-
tent prudent and determinable, also designate critical habitat.402 Yet as 
Houck explains, in many instances the Department has “simply refused to 
designate critical habitat at all.”403 
In describing the Interior’s reluctance and/or refusal to designate and 
protect critical habitat during Bruce Babbitt’s tenure, lawyers from the 
EarthJustice Legal Fund argued that “[t]his action—or inaction—by the 
Department [of Interior] is a deliberate subversion of public process by an 
agency that has made a conscious decision not to enforce a law that the vast 
majority of the American public supports.”404 This behavior has apparently 
continued with Secretary Gale Norton. The administration has been de-
scribed as entering into “behind-the-scenes settlements with industry liti-
gants that are challenging critical habitat designations.”405 The settlements 
 
 400. Former U.S. Department of Interior Secretary Bruce E. Babbitt repeatedly used the term “train 
wrecks” to describe the conflicts between landowners and the ESA. See, e.g., Marla Cone, Protection 
for Owl Challenged, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at A3 (“‘economic train wrecks’ that occur when the 
federal government steps in with the Endangered Species Act to save species headed toward extinc-
tion”). 
 401. See Wiygul & Weiner, supra note 197, at 13 (“Put simply, DOI has bowed to political pres-
sure from property rights groups and corporate developers.”). 
 402. 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000). 
 403. Houck, supra note 394, at 297. 
 404. Wiygul & Weiner, supra note 197, at 13. See also Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical 
Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2000) (noting that as of 1999 critical habitat had been designated for only ten 
percent of the listed species); Houck, supra note 394, at 302 (1993) (noting that as of 1992, critical 
habitat had been designated for only sixteen percent of the listed species). As of June 2003 it was 
estimated that the Service had designated critical habitat for approximately one-third of the listed 
species. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 
USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED 
FOR CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS 6, 8 (Aug. 2003) (stating that 1,263 species were listed as 
endangered and that, of those, 417 had critical habitat designated) at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d03803.pdf. 
 405. Michael Senatore et al., Critical Habitat at the Crossroads: Responding to the G. W. Bush 
Administration’s Attacks on Critical Habitat Designation Under the ESA, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
447, 448 (2003). 
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typically involve a remand of the designation to allow for extensive eco-
nomic impact analysis while no critical habitat is protected.406 
Another way to assure that few designations are made is to include the 
cost of listing the species in the economic impact analysis for the designa-
tion of critical habitat for that species. Before New Mexico Cattle Growers 
Association v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,407 the Department of Interior 
used an “incremental baseline approach.” Under such an approach, the 
costs from listing the species were ignored because the decision to list a 
species must be made solely on the basis of the best available scientific and 
commercial data. In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the industry challengers 
argued, however, that Congress intended for all costs, including those asso-
ciated with listing, to be included in the economic impact analysis for des-
ignations of critical habitat.408 The Service responded that if it were re-
quired to abandon this approach, it would improperly consider economic 
impacts in its listing decisions.409 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, agreed with the industry challengers and rejected the base-
line approach. 
The Service did not appeal the ruling. Then, “[w]ithout soliciting pub-
lic comment or waiting for the judgment of any other Circuit Court, and 
without revisiting its controversial assertions about the redundancy of criti-
cal habitat, the Bush Administration has quietly adopted the New Mexico 
Cattle Growers holding as administration policy”410 for all Circuits.411 In-
deed, Secretary Norton and industry plaintiffs urged the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia to adopt the Tenth Circuit’s approach.412 The 
district court declined that invitation but vacated the Service’s use of the 
baseline approach in two final rules designating critical habitat and ordered 
it to revise the rules by July 30, 2004.413 If the Service is correct that aban-
 
 406. Id. at 448, 463-66, 465 n.103. 
 407. 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (industry challenge of Service’s economic analysis of desig-
nating critical habitat for the southwest willow flycatcher). 
 408. Id. at 1280 (“baseline approach to measuring economic impact . . . is an erroneous construc-
tion, and thus, a violation of the ESA”). 
 409.  Id. at 1285. 
 410. Endangered Species Act Before the Comm. on Senate Environment and Public Works, Sub-
comm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of John Kostyack, Senior 
Counsel, National Wildlife Federation), available at 2003 WL 11717440 [hereinafter Kostyack]. 
 411. Home Builders Associations of Northern California v. Norton, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 412. Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 100, 102 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 413. Id. at 105, 108-09. The Department states that it will propose critical habitat for these species 
on April 1, 2004. Unified Agenda, Proposed Rule Stage, 68 Fed. Reg. 73,091-01 (Dec. 22, 2003). Be-
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doning the baseline approach will inject inappropriately economic impacts 
into the listing of new species, there is every expectation that listing new 
species will become increasingly difficult.414 
B. Sound Science 
The Executive Branch is also at least rhetorically endorsing the use of 
“sound science,” with peer review as its centerpiece.415 Pursuant to the In-
formation Quality Act,416 an appropriations rider, OMB directed agencies 
to (1) “[i]ssue their own information quality guidelines” for the information 
they disseminate, (2) establish administrative procedures to allow the pub-
lic to challenge the correctness of information that the agencies dissemi-
nate, and (3) report periodically to OMB on the complaints the agencies re-
ceive about the accuracy of their information.417 Citing the Information 
Quality Act as its statutory authority, OMB recently proposed guidance for 
agencies to engage in a peer-review process,418 because “[a] more uniform 
peer review policy promises to make regulatory science more competent 
and credible, thereby advancing the administration’s ‘smart regulation’ 
agenda.”419 
This appropriations rider and the ensuing executive actions replay a 
theme of the Contract with America420 and bills that have been introduced 
 
cause the court vacated the baseline approach, the Service will in effect have to develop another meth-
odology for economic impact analysis by the end of July 2004 as well. 
 414.  Kostyack, supra note 410. 
 415. But see Jennifer 8. Lee, The President’s Budget Proposal: The Outlays—Environment; Re-
search Budget is Lowered Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at A16 (noting that the budget for the 
agency’s competitive grants program, which pays for studies outside the agency, had been cut by about 
a third from previous levels). 
 416. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2000). 
 417. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458 (Feb. 22, 2002). The 
Department of Interior’s guidelines became effective on October 1, 2003. U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Information Quality Guidelines 2, at http://irm.fws.gov/infoguidelines/FWS%20Information 
%20Quality%20Guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). 
 418. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 
2003); Politics, Science Like Oil, Water, ATLANTA J. CONST. Jan 20, 2004, at 10A. 
 419. Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Proposes Draft Peer Review Stan-
dards for Regulatory Science (Aug. 29, 2003) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2003-
34.pdf. 
 420. E.g., Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 637 (1995) (re-
quiring agencies to develop program for independent, external peer review); Endangered Species Fair 
Regulatory Process Reform Act, H.R. 4556, 105th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (1998) (requiring independent peer 
review, issuance of rules to establish criteria to be met for the data, inclusion of species field observa-
tion studies in the data, and “substantial evidence” for the listing process). 
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in the years following it.421 For example, in the Sound Science Saves Spe-
cies Act of 2002, Congress proposed that in order to designate critical habi-
tat, the Service would be required to “give greater weight to scientific or 
commercial data that is empirical or has been field-tested or peer-
reviewed.”422 Another proposal would have required all listing decisions to 
be supported by “clear and convincing evidence,”423 and such decisions 
would have to be reviewed by an independent board to determine the “suf-
ficiency of all relevant scientific information and assumptions.”424 
This emphasis on the use of sound science implies that one of the ma-
jor problems with the Endangered Species Act is that the Fish and Wildlife 
Service is making decisions based upon unreliable or untested information. 
The Act requires the Secretary to make her decisions based on “the best 
scientific and commercial data available.”425 Though the statute does not 
provide much guidance on this criteria, in 1994 the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice along with the National Marine Fisheries Service and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration adopted a policy to use a wide 
variety of sources of information, including informal sources such as oral, 
traditional, or anecdotal, as well as more formal sources such as peer-
reviewed scientific studies.426 The Service committed itself to evaluating 
the information impartially and ensuring that any information used to im-
plement the ESA would be reliable and credible in addition to representing 
“the best scientific and commercial data available.”427 The Service adopted 
another joint policy to incorporate independent peer review.428 
Though the Service has taken these affirmative steps to ensure that it 
bases its decisions upon reliable and credible scientific information, the 
perception has arisen in Congress and the administration that the Service is 
using “unsound” science to make its determinations. There is scant evi-
 
 421. E.g., Sound Science For Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th 
Cong. (2002). 
 422. Scientifically Identifying the Need for Critical Habitat Act, H.R. 2602, 108th Cong. § 3(a) 
(2003); see also Sound Science for Endangered Species Decisionmaking Act of 2002, S. 1912, 107th 
Cong. (2002); Endangered Species Fair Regulatory Process Reform Act, H.R. 4556, 105th Cong. § 2 
(1998). 
 423. Sound Science Saves Species Act of 2002, H.R. 3705, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2002). 
 424. Id. § 3(c). 
 425. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), 1536(c)(1) (2000). 
 426. Notice of Interagency Cooperation Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994). 
 427. Id. 
 428. Notice of Interagency Cooperation Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activi-
ties, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994). 
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dence, however, that this perception bears any relation to reality.429 In fact a 
1999 study of the use of science in habitat conservation plans found that the 
Service was making good use of the available data.430 Instead, as Kathleen 
McGinty, former chair of CEQ, “denounced the reform efforts [of the 104th 
Congress] as hiding a destructive deregulatory agenda beneath rhetoric 
about sound science,”431 arguably, the same could be said of the current 
administration’s efforts. 
1. Subversive Mechanisms 
Some would argue that through the proposed guidance on peer review, 
OMB is trying hijack the process from the agencies432 to advance a subver-
sive, deregulatory agenda. Outlined below are some of the guidance’s key 
provisions to that end. For example, under the proposal, each agency would 
be required to submit a report to OMB at least once a year with a summary 
of “existing, ongoing, or contemplated scientific or technical studies that 
might (in whole or in part) constitute or support significant regulatory in-
formation the agency intends to disseminate.”433 OMB may require “for-
mal, independent, external peer review” of any agency information that it 
selects,434 and if requested, the agency must discuss with OMB a specific 
document and whether the planned review of that document is sufficient.435 
The proposal also discourages the use of academic experts who have re-
ceived grants from agencies but does not issue similar warning against us-
ing experts with connections to regulated industries.436 Additionally, agen-
 
 429. Cf. Wagner, supra note 383 (examining three sound science reforms and finding that none of 
them “are supported by meaningful evidence that the purported problem—’bad science’, or more pre-
cisely, science that is methodologically unsound—occurs with any regularity in administrative deci-
sionmaking”). 
 430. Peter Kareiva, et al., Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans 4, at 
http://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/projects/97KAREI2/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf (last visited on Feb. 28, 
2004). The study noted that the Service did not have the resources to obtain the necessary data. Id. The 
study urged the Service to err on the side of caution and not approve habitat conservation plans when 
data is scarce, though it acknowledged that the statute does not require the Secretary to obtain more data 
but to base her decision on the best available data. Id. at 45-46. Thus, the study seemed to question the 
quantity not the quality of the science used in the decisionmaking process. 
 431. Ronald Begley, Deregulatory Moves in Congress Meet Resistance from Administration, 
CHEM. WK., Feb. 22, 1995, 1995 WL 10012152. 
 432. Politics, Science Like Oil, Water, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 20, 2004, at A10. 
 433. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,029 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
 434. Id. at 54,027. 
 435. Id. at 54,028. 
 436. Rick Weiss, Peer Review Plan Draws Criticism Under Bush Proposal: OMB Would Evaluate 
Science Before New Rules Take Effect, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at A19. See Proposed Bulletin on 
Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,025, 54,027 (Sept. 15, 2003); See also 
Letter from Linda Greer, Director, Health and Environment Program, Natural Resources Defense 
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cies must provide OMB with a copy of any request from the public for cor-
rection of information within seven days of receipt.437 Further, upon 
OMB’s request, an agency must provide a copy of its draft response at least 
seven days before issuing it, and OMB must approve the response before 
issuance.438 
One motivation for wresting control of the peer review process is that 
according to a report prepared for Representative Henry A. Waxman, the 
administration is skewing science on a number of issues, many of which 
have significant economic impact for President Bush’s large corporate do-
nors.439 The report argues that the administration has used three basic 
strategies: (1) manipulating the composition of scientific advisory commit-
tees, (2) suppressing or distorting scientific information, and (3) interfering 
with scientific research.440 Similarly, a report prepared by the Democratic 
staff of the House Committee on Resources accuses the Department of In-
terior of manipulating scientific information for political purposes.441 Be-
cause Interior often appears to ignore the expert advice of its own scien-
tists, the report dubs the administration’s scientific approach to regulation 
“weird science.”442 One climate policy expert observed, “[p]olitical staff 
are becoming increasingly bold in forcing agency officials to endorse junk 
science.”443 More than sixty prominent scientists, including twenty Nobel 
Laureates, signed a statement criticizing the Bush Administration for its 
misuse of science.444 Below are some specific examples of how the admini-
 
Council to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Management and Budget 2-5 (Dec. 11, 2003), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/72.pdf (arguing that if scientists who receive govern-
ment funding are eliminated as possible peer reviewers, the result would be the use of scientists whose 
research is funded by the regulated industries); Letter from Winston H. Hickox, Agency Secretary, Cali-
fornia Environmental Protection Agency, to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Management and Budget 2, 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/64.pdf (Oct. 28, 2003) (citing need to address poten-
tial for economic conflicts of interest beyond that of reviewers who have worked with an agency or re-
ceived a grant from an agency). 
 437. Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023, 54,029 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
 438. Id. 
 439. MINORITY STAFF OF COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 2 at http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_ 
science_rep.pdf (Nov. 13, 2003) (prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
 440. Id. at 2-3. 
 441. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF COMM. ON RESOURCES, WEIRD SCIENCE: THE INTERIOR 
DEPARTMENT’S MANIPULATION OF SCIENCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES at http://www.ourforests.org/ 
weirdscience.pdf (Dec. 17, 2002) (Rep. Nick J. Rahall). 
 442. Id. at 1. 
 443. Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye, Report by the E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A1. 
 444. RSI [Restoring Scientific Integrity] Signatories at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/ 
rsi/page.cfm?pageID=1335 (last revised Apr. 16, 2004). 
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stration’s use of science (sound, weird, junk or otherwise) has impacted 
species protection negatively. 
2. Pernicious Results 
Many believe that OMB’s proposal is designed “to inject White House 
politics into the world of science and to use the uncertainty that surrounds 
science to delay new rules that could cost regulated industries millions of 
dollars.”445 Indeed, the promotion of “sound science” has provided the 
Bush Administration’s basis for delaying several new regulations,446 yet the 
absence of science has not prevented the administration from dismantling 
current regulations.447 On the side of increasing or even maintaining envi-
ronmental protections, this strategy is important, for as Oliver Houck points 
out, “to decision-makers who require irrefutable proof, the uncertainty is 
fatal.”448 According to Houck, what President Bush means by using sound 
 
 445. Weiss, supra note 436; see also Greer, supra note 414, at 6 (proposal “will magnify the exces-
sive delays that already plague the rulemaking process”); Hickox, supra note 409, at 1, 3 (commenting 
that proposed guidelines would burden the agencies and delay the release of information needed for 
science-based regulation). 
 446. See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, Scientists Frustrated with Administration, HOUS. CHRON., July 24, 
2003, at 5A. In March 2001, the Bush Administration withdrew the new arsenic standards established in 
the waning days of the Clinton Administration. Eric Pianin & Cindy Skrzycki, EPA to Kill New Arsenic 
Standards; Whitman Cites Debate On Drinking Water Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at A1. In 
April 2001, EPA announced that a new rule would be released in eleven months, after a study by the 
National Academy of Sciences. Mike Allen, EPA to Lower Level for Arsenic in Water, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 19, 2001, at A8. EPA then reinstated the rule seven months later after the study showed an even 
greater risk than had been thought previously to exist. As Senator Barbara Boxer explained, “‘They or-
dered a new study as a delaying tactic, and it came back and bit them in the arsenic.’” Edward Walsh, 
Arsenic Drinking Water Standard Issued; After Seven-Month Scientific Review, EPA Backs Clinton-
Established Levels, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A31. 
 447. See Ann McFeatters, Bush Accused of Hiding Rule Rollbacks with War, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 8, 2003, at A10 (listing examples of the Bush Administration using “sound science” to 
justify relaxing regulations). For example, in changing in the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review regu-
lations to give industry greater flexibility to modify their facilities without meeting more stringent stan-
dards, EPA cited no evidence that the changes would not adversely affect air quality. See Politics of 
Pollution, DENV. POST, Sept. 2, 2003 at B7, at 2003 WL 5510408 (citing General Accounting Office’s 
statement that EPA had no scientific data supporting it assertion that the new rules will not make air 
pollution worse). 
 448. Oliver Houck, Editorial, How Industry Hijacked ‘Sound Science’, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 29, 
2004, at 7. Consider the delay tactic concerning global warming and the Kyoto Protocol. Rather than 
join the Protocol, the Bush Administration has recommended a 10-year study of the issue because the 
science is too uncertain. Maureen Lorenzetti, Climate Control, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 11, 2003, 2003 WL 
9183441; Global Climate Change Policy Book, Exec. Summ., Feb. 2002 at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html. Apparently following the ad-
vice of the Luntz memo, the Administration has worked “to make the lack of scientific certainty the 
primary issue in the debate.” Luntz Memo, supra note 85, at 137. 
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science is, “[w]e will not act until the science is conclusive, i.e., a cold day 
in hell.”449 
a. Delay: A River Doesn’t Run Through It 
Following OMB’s lead, CEQ is flexing its muscles to make the agen-
cies fall in line.450 It ordered the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Army 
Corps of Engineers to rethink their plans to release more water down the 
Missouri River to save endangered fish and birds.451 Acting under the di-
rection of the CEQ, the Corps “intended to seek to rewrite the Fish and 
Wildlife Services’ ‘biological opinion’” that dam operations needed to be 
refashioned to save three endangered species.452 Though the National 
Academy of Science supported the release, President Bush supported the 
status quo during a campaign trip to Missouri. Representative John Thune 
urged President Bush to support the release, but as he explained, of course 
Bush “wants to honor the commitments he made in Missouri.” To that end, 
the White House endorsed a five-year plan to study the impact of increased 
water levels.453 
Later, according to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS), the Bush Administration formed a new team to review the situation 
and make a quick judgment.454 According to UCS, the new fifteen-member 
team included two of the scientists from the original team and was lead by 
co-leaders with little expertise on the Missouri River. Unlike the original 
 
 449. Houck, supra note 448. 
 450. This phenomenon is not limited to the Department of Interior. For example, CEQ, with a few 
changes from OMB, sent back to EPA a report on the state of the environment ordering it to change the 
section on climate change. As reported by the New York Times, 
An April 29 memorandum circulated among staff members said that after the changes by 
White House officials, the section on climate “no longer accurately represents scientific con-
sensus on climate change.” Another memorandum circulated at the same time said that the 
easiest course would be to accept the White House revisions but that to do so would taint the 
agency, because “E.P.A. will take responsibility and severe criticism from the science and en-
vironmental communities for poorly representing the science.” 
Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye, Report by the E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al. 
 451. Michael Grunwald, Bush Delays Action on Missouri River; Agencies Ordered to Consult on 
‘Spring Rise’, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at A29. 
 452. Whitehouse, Army Corps Sound Retreat on Missouri River, U.S. Newswire, June 13, 2002, 
2002 WL 22068412. 
 453. Bill Lambrecht, White House Backs Delay in River Changes: Move is Victory for Officials 
Here; Plan Would Have Mimicked Missouri’s Natural Flow, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 14, 2002, 
at A1. 
 454. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE 16 (2004), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/documents/RSI_final_fullreport.pdf. 
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report, the new team’s report was not independently peer-reviewed.455 
Though UCS is not certain whether the new plan will protect the at-risk 
species effectively— 
What is clear, however, is that the Bush administration’s political agenda 
has interfered with the scientific integrity of the policy making process in 
this case. Allyn Sapa, a recently retired biologist with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service who supervised the Missouri River project for more 
than five years, commented about the whole affair: “It’s hard not to think 
that because our findings don’t match up with what they want to hear, 
they are putting a new team on the job who will give them what they 
want.”456 
Thus, it would appear that the Bush Administration supports the use of 
sound science as long as it does not cause the president to break a cam-
paign promise or cause his corporate donors to expend more resources on 
environmental protection.457 As one commentator opined, when President 
Bush receives sound science, he says, “hear no science, see no science, de-
lete all science.”458 
With respect to the Klamath River Basin, the Department of Interior 
disregarded the recommendation of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service that endangered fish in that basin should 
receive more water. Instead, Secretary Norton commissioned further study 
by the National Academies’ National Research Council (“NRC”).459 
Though the Act requires the Secretary to make her decisions based upon 
the best available information,460 and the Services made their recommenda-
tions based on such, Secretary Norton chose to disregard the statutory 
mandate. Here the problem seemed not to be that the Service had used un-
sound science, but that it did not have enough science.461 As one Fish and 
Wildlife Service official explained, the NRC’s report “didn’t say the sci-
ence proves we were wrong; they just said there wasn’t enough science to 
 
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. 
 457. See Grunwald, supra note 451 (“[Thune] acknowledged that scientific studies and legal re-
quirements might not be the final arbiter of this battle.”) 
 458. Derrick Z. Jackson, Bush Doesn’t Hear ‘Sound Science’, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Aug. 5, 2003, at B7. After several lawsuits, the controversy over the flows of the Missouri River con-
tinues. A new management plan for the river is due to be released in March 2004. Ben House, Missouri 
Manual Awaited in March, ARGUS LEADER, Feb. 20, 2004, at 1A. 
 459. Michael Grunwald, Scientific Report Roils a Salmon War, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2002, at A1. 
 460. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2000). 
 461. Grunwald, supra note 459 (reporting the interim finding was that there “was ‘no substantial 
scientific foundation’” for the Service’s conclusion about the effect of the irrigation project on the en-
dangered fish). 
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prove us right.”462 Wendy Wagner persuasively argues that earnest debates 
about science are not about the quality of science but rather the quantity of 
science required to establish protective regulations.463 She argues that this 
“misdirected focus on the quality of science might be an accident, although 
it is more likely to be at least partly deliberate. Regulated parties fare better 
when the focus is on the quality of scientific research, rather than on the 
value choices undergirding protectionist policies.”464 
Yet another example of the Bush Administration’s dismissal of sci-
ence is its proposal to count hatchery salmon along with wild salmon to de-
termine whether the Endangered Species Act should continue to protect 
Pacific salmon.465 Six leading salmon experts argue that counting hatchery 
salmon “could have devastating consequences” by “confound[ing] risk of 
extinction in the wild.”466 Indian tribes are said to favor the move insofar as 
the proposal is used to improve hatchery stock,467 without regard to its im-
pact on wild salmon. 
These two examples can be characterized as policy erosion at a macro-
level.468 Yet still more problematic is the erosion that likely is occurring at 
the micro-level, and unfortunately, this activity largely can go unnoticed by 
the public.469 Many of these moves are not headline grabbers but part of it-
erative day-to-day discretionary decision making. Despite the widespread 
public support for protecting endangered species and Congress’ inability to 
amend the Act, the Executive Branch very well may be chipping away at 
 
 462. Id. The final report from NRC is not yet available to the general public, but it states that there 
is no causal link between water levels and the survival of the endangered species. “While the committee 
that wrote the report endorsed proposals for a water storage bank and for special seasonal flow 
adjustments, it was skeptical of the value of increasing restrictions on the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s 
Klamath Project . . . .” Press Release, The National Academies, Broader Approach Needed for 
Protection And Recovery of Fish in Klamath River Basin (Oct. 22, 2003) at http://www4.national 
academies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309090970?OpenDocument. 
 463. Wagner, supra note 383, at 109-32. 
 464. Id. at 112. 
 465. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Policy on the Consideration of Hatchery-
Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act Listing Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 69 
Fed. Reg. 31,354 (June 3, 2004). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has already 
proposed listings using this proposed policy. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Listing 
Determinations for 27 ESUs of West Coast Salmonids, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,102 (June 14, 2004). 
 466. Ransom A. Myers, et al., Hatcheries and Endangered Salmon, 303 SCI. MAG. 1980 (2004). 
 467. Charles Pope, Bush Plan Could Change Protections for Salmon, HOUS. CHRON., May 2, 2004, 
at 7A. 
 468. Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Politics By Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Im-
plementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 194-97 (2001) (describing 
erosion of EPA’s policymaking at a macro-level in implementing the Food Quality Protection Act). 
 469. Cf. id. at 198 (describing policy erosion “[b]ecause micro-policymaking at the staff level is 
largely hidden from public view” for implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act). 
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that protection. Thomas McGarity explains the process of how agencies can 
subvert statutory policies, 
as the program office within the implementing agency engages in con-
siderably less visible day-to-day resolution of science/policy questions 
on a case-by-case basis. In both cases, strongly articulated statutory poli-
cies can erode away under constant pressures from interests groups that 
opposed those policies during the legislative debates and continue to op-
pose them during the implementation stage.470 
Moreover, this focus on the procedural aspects of scientific review ex-
cludes all but the most resourceful, “attentive regulatory participants,” 
namely “regulated industries or their advocates.”471 The poster-children for 
many of these reforms—small landowners—realistically cannot be ex-
pected to engage in this type of analysis and advocacy.472 Instead, well-
financed developers are the ones likely to take advantage of the guidance’s 
procedures, such as challenging information disseminated by the Service.473 
And challenges by industry may be numerous because the costs of such 
challenges are minimal, whereas “the benefits of abusing these provisions 
can be considerable to private parties; at best they can lead to the exclusion 
or discrediting of pivotal studies that undergird protective regulation, and at 
worst, they can divert the agency’s resources and priorities away from de-
veloping protection policies.”474 
b. Deregulation: The “No Surprises” Rule 
One of the criticisms of the Act is that is does not provide landowners 
adequate notice of prohibitions or adequate assurance that development can 
proceed without fear of prosecution. In partial response to this concern, the 
Service implemented a “no surprises” policy475 as part of the incidental take 
permitting process under section 10 of the Act. This policy “quietly” as-
sured landowners that if they took conservation measures pursuant to a 
habitat conservation plan, they would not be subjected later to demands for 
additional commitments of land or money, even if the needs of the pro-
 
 470. Id. at 194 (2001) (citation omitted). 
 471. Wagner, supra note 383, 103-04 (2003). 
 472. Cf. id. at 63, 103-04 (suggesting that resources and expertise are necessary to participate mean-
ingfully under such reforms). 
 473. The Fish and Wildlife Service has received only two challenges under the Information Quality 
Act. The national public interest group, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility initiated 
one challenge and Fjord Seafood initiated the other one. OMB Watch, Data Quality Challenges, at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1419#fws (last visited May 11, 2004). 
 474. Wagner, supra note 383, at 105. 
 475. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 
23, 1998). 
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tected species changed over time.476 The Service stated that Congress “en-
visioned and allowed the Federal government to provide assurances . . . 
through the § 10 incidental take permit process [and a] driving concern dur-
ing the development of this policy was the absence of adequate incentives 
for non-Federal landowners to factor endangered species conservation into 
their day-to-day land management activities.”477 Concerns abounded, how-
ever, about whether the administration could make regulatory changes to 
accomplish that which Congress had been unable to do.478 Despite the 
many questions regarding the soundness of this policy,479 the Service for-
malized it as a regulation in 1998.480 
The chief practical concern among conservationists was that the rule 
would not allow the Service to require additional conservation or mitiga-
tion measures if in the future the need arose to take more protective meas-
ures to ensure that development activities would “not appreciably reduce 
 
 476. George T. Frampton, Jr., ‘Quiet Success’ of Endangered Species Act, ROLL CALL, Apr. 3, 
1995 (Frampton was the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, Department of Interior.). 
 477. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 
23, 1998). But see Houck, supra note 394, at 285 (arguing that Congress intended this provision to give 
limited flexibility). 
 478. Cf. Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other Regula-
tory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998) (arguing 
that EPA exceeded it legal authority). Another example of an environmental agency recently exceeding 
its statutory authority is EPA with respect to the Clean Air Act and the regulations for New Source Re-
view. In October 2003 it changed the types of modifications to stationary sources of pollution such as 
power and industrial plants that would be subject to certain regulations. Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of 
the Routine Maintenance Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248-01 (Oct. 27, 2003) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). There had been many legislative initiatives to amend the Clean 
Air Act in this fashion, but none were successful. However, Vice President Dick Cheney’s energy task 
force made a recommendation to EPA after studying industry complaints about enforcement actions and 
out of that recommendation sprang this revised rule. Katherine Q. Seelye & Jennifer 8. Lee, Court 
Blocks U.S. Effort to Relax Pollution Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, 25, 2003, at A1. See Reliable, Affordable, 
and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future: Report of the National Energy Policy Devel-
opment Group (May 6, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. A 
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia questioned whether 
the Administration had the authority to make this change and stayed the rule pending litigation. New 
York v. EPA, No. 03-1380, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 26520, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 2003); see also 
Seelye & Lee, supra note 478, at A1. 
 479. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8861-68 
(Feb. 23, 1998) (summarizing comments on the proposed rule). 
 480. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2004). The rule was finalized initially as a part of the Endangered Species 
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook in 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854-02 (Dec. 2, 1996). A non-profit 
organization sued the Service and as part of the settlement, the Service agreed to subject the rule to fur-
ther public comment and ultimately reissued the rule in 1998. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances 
(“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
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the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild.”481 In 
fact, a group of scientists meeting at Stanford University objected to the 
rule “because it runs counter to the natural world, which is full of sur-
prises.”482 Nature and scientific research both will produce “surprises;” tim-
ing is the only question.483 The “No Surprises” Rule does not allow the 
Service to require amendments to habitat conservation plans when “sur-
prises” occur, however, except under limited conditions. 
In providing this assurance to private landowners, the rule draws a dis-
tinction between “changed circumstances” and “unforeseen circum-
stances,” and the rule is problematic in either case. “Changed circum-
stances” reasonably can be anticipated and planned for,484 whereas 
“unforeseen circumstances” cannot reasonably be anticipated and result in 
substantial, adverse change to the condition of the listed species.485 If addi-
tional conservation or mitigation measures not provided for in the plan are 
necessary to address changed circumstances, the Service will not require 
additional measures.486 If additional conservation or mitigation measures 
are necessary to address unforeseen circumstances, the Service may require 
additional conservation or mitigation measures, but it “will not involve the 
commitment of additional land, water or financial compensation or addi-
tional restriction on the use of land, water, or other natural resources oth-
erwise available for development or use under the original terms of the 
conservation plan or without the consent of the permittee.”487 
The Spirit of Sage Council, a coalition of Native Americans, commu-
nity groups, and citizens, recently renewed their challenge of the No Sur-
prises Rule on a several grounds, including that the rule violates sections 2, 
3(3), 7(a)(1), and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act. The rule, the 
Council argued, prevents the Service from making changes to incidental 
take permits that may be necessary for the continued survival of listed spe-
cies and it allows the Service to issue permits under conditions not author-
 
 481. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv)(2004) (one of the conditions for issuing an incidental take per-
mit). 
 482. A Statement on Proposed Private Lands Initiatives and Reauthorization of the Endangered 
Species Act from the Meeting of Scientists at Stanford University (March 31, 1997), at 
http://www.defenders.org/esa-6.html. 
 483. Id. 
 484. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004). 
 485. Id. 
 486. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(ii) (2004) (endangered species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5)(ii) (2004) 
(threatened species). 
 487. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(iii)(B) (2004) (endangered species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5)(iii)(B) 
(2004) (threatened species). 
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ized by the Act.488 In December 2003, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia remanded the rule for reconsideration by the Service489 and in 
June 2004, the court prohibited the issuance of new incidental take permits 
with “‘No Surprise’ assurances” pending adoption of new revocation 
rules.490 The No Surprises Rule was an attempt to diffuse a volatile situa-
tion, but it failed to give due consideration to some of the principles and 
values undergirding species protection. 
VIII.  A QUESTION OF VALUES AND NEW ENTITLEMENTS 
The initiatives proposed to address the problems that political rhetoric 
describes often involve the use of certain types of analysis, such as taking 
impact analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and sound science. Much of the reli-
ance upon these seemingly objective analyses, however, is likely subter-
fuge for a discussion of values.491 The political rhetoric blurs the issues in 
this important debate and precludes meaningful discussion. Amid this 
noise, some would argue that we need “to restore a sense of moral urgency 
to the protection of life, health, and the environment.”492 
The rhetoric assumes that certain values hinge upon unfettered private 
property rights and that these initiatives promote those values. These values 
include wealth, autonomy, and freedom.493 Privileging these values over 
others results in policies that do not adequately take into account other val-
ues that the public has expressed as important. These include anthropocen-
tric and biocentric values such as human health, ecology, aesthetics, and 
cultural heritage. 
And the rhetoric excludes certain segments of the public from the 
conversation. The National Academies formed the Public Participation in 
Environmental Assessment and Decision Making panel to study ways in 
which federal agencies can improve public participation in environmental 
 
 488. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 489. Id. The court did not reach the merits of the No Surprises Rule but found that it was suffi-
ciently intertwined with the Permit Revocation Rule, Safe Harbor Agreements, and Candidate Conser-
vation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706, 32,712-14 (June 17, 1999), which it had va-
cated, to justify remand. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 85, 91-92. 
 490. Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, No. 98-1873, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10789, at *4 (D.D.C. 
June 10, 2004). 
 491. Pete Bodo, What Rules Are Needed to Keep the Wilderness Wild?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, 
at 10 (“This really is about a clash of values . . . . You have people who cherish solitude, exercise and 
backcountry traditions versus people who have grown accustomed to complete freedom of motorized 
access.” (quoting Rollen Sparrowe, Pres. Wildlife Management Institute)). 
 492. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 369, at 11. 
 493. Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 68 
(2003). 
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assessment and decision-making. As an EPA scientist explained, agencies 
“are concerned that they hear from only certain segments of the public and 
that ‘huge gaps’ remain in the perspectives provided . . . . Different seg-
ments of the public have divergent information and values that are impor-
tant for federal agencies to understand.”494 One of the panel members re-
marked that too often Congress thinks that risk and cost-benefit analysis 
can solve complex environmental problems, but public participation and 
appreciation of divergent values are also needed.495 
Victor Flatt argues that we cannot successfully implement environ-
mental laws without consideration of certain “squishy” values that have not 
been traditionally quantifiable by cost-benefit analysis.496 Yet “[b]oth sides 
of the regulatory debate often engage in a conspiratorial silence about these 
values.”497 Flatt suggests that even if the participants in the debate are 
aware of these values they do not discuss them because they are afraid. On 
one side they are afraid that they will be considered irrational, and on the 
other they fear that acknowledgement of these values will give the values 
legitimacy.498 Flatt acknowledges that including these squishy values 
makes the decision-making process susceptible to a certain amount of sub-
jectivity. Being aware of and recognizing the limitations arising from this 
subjectivity would force decision makers to make the difficult choices by 
openly including these values rather than disingenuously asserting that the 
agency can simply apply a technical formula and derive the solution.499 
In this debate, these unspoken or blurry values heavily influence the 
implementation of the ESA and proposals for reform. The outcomes are 
consistent with the values hidden in the political rhetoric but not necessar-
ily with those that the public has expressed for species protection. For ex-
ample, despite the Contract with America having as one of its aims the 
 
 494. Academies to Review Ways to Boost Public Involvement in Decisionmaking, DAILY REP. FOR 
EXECUTIVES (BNA), No. 153, at A-19 (Aug. 8, 2003) (remarks of Michael Slimak, an ecological scien-
tist in EPA’s Office and Research and Development).  
 495. Id. 
 496. Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back Into the Fold 
With A New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). 
 497. Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA Implementation by 
Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as Environmental Values under 
NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 102 (1994). 
 498. Id. 
 499. Flatt, supra note 496, at 3. This phenomenon is also known as the “science charade”, wherein 
agencies exaggerate the contributions of science in developing regulations in order to shirk accountabil-
ity for their underlying policy decisions. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regula-
tion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995). 
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elimination of many entitlements,500 the proposed Endangered Species 
Land Management Reform Act would have created a new entitlement. Un-
der the common law “public ownership doctrine,” the government owns all 
wildlife for the benefit of the public and has the right to protect that wild-
life on private property. No property owner may claim a right to harm wild-
life absent authorization from the public.501 Courts consistently have sanc-
tioned the government’s ability to regulate, without compensation, private 
land use for the benefit of wildlife under this doctrine.502 Thus, by provid-
ing compensation under the Endangered Species Land Management Re-
form Act, Congress would have created a new right. 
Moreover, if the government holds threatened and endangered species 
in trust for its citizenry, should not a developer who wishes to take such re-
sources be required to compensate the citizenry for what Professor Richard 
Epstein deems the converse eminent domain? Professor Epstein asks first 
whether the government should transfer public property to private entities 
and then if it does make such a transfer, what compensation is due. 
The problem of disposing of public property thus raises the mirror image 
of public use and just compensation questions under the Fifth Amend-
ment: “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” The underlying problems are not any simpler when deal-
ing with property which was originally held by the public in common, 
for now the guiding principle is in a sense the converse of the original 
eminent domain clause, to wit: “No public property may be transferred to 
private use, without just compensation,” payable to the public at large.503 
The common law and the Endangered Species Act place an obligation upon 
the government to protect these public trust assets. In the event that the 
government decides to alienate them, it must receive compensation for such 
transactions.504 
And although every reform-minded member of Congress seemingly 
had a horror story to tell about a small landowner in his district, the Endan-
 
 500. E.g., Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) (2000) (re-
moving drug addiction or alcoholism as a basis for awarding disability benefits under the Old Age Sur-
vivor and Disability Insurance program); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000) (changing, inter alia, direct payments to individuals under Assis-
tance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to block grants to states to use at their discretion). 
 501. John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protec-
tion and the Takings Clause, 16 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 331, 333 (2003). 
 502. Id. at 346-50. See also Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What 
Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 297, 308-321 (1995) (outlining country’s tradition of protecting wildlife without com-
pensating landowners beginning with the English common law roots and continuing into the present). 
 503. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 419 (1987). 
 504. Cf. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 515 (2002) (proposing a “sky-
trust” to capture the value of the public’s interest in the atmosphere). 
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gered Species Land Management Reform Act primarily would have bene-
fited large landowners (and lawyers). A relatively small number of private 
entities own the majority of private land. “Approximately 125,000 timber 
or farm owners, less than two-tenths of one percent of all private landown-
ers, own 38% of all the private land in the United States. Timber and farm 
interests that amount to less than 3% of all landowners, own more than 
80% of all private land.”505 Representative John Conyers of Michigan criti-
cized a similar bill, arguing that “[t]he result of such a measure passing 
would be . . . hard-working American taxpayers . . . forced to watch as their 
hard-earned wages are collected by the Government, as taxes are paid out 
to corporations . . . and large landowners as takings compensation.”506 
Though Congress was unsuccessful in passing such “takings” legisla-
tion, the Bush Administration has been able to compensate those landown-
ers through incentive programs designed to encourage conservation. The 
beneficiaries of these new subsidies may tend to be the wealthy, at the ex-
pense of the average taxpayer.507 Such compensation schemes create a 
“two-tiered system of laws” with one group of people simply complying 
with the ESA, while another group would be paid by the government to 
comply.508 American jurist James Kent espoused private property rights to 
the extent that they are “consistent with good order, and the reciprocal 
rights of others.”509 Such a compensation scheme is inconsistent with both 
of these goals. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The political rhetoric surrounding the Endangered Species Act is se-
ductive. It lures its audience into a world where costs eclipse benefits, con-
jecture prevails over sound science, and species protection abrogates pri-
vate property rights. It is a world that is out of balance and needs to be 
righted by some common sense initiatives. Though the Contract with 
 
 505. Hearing on Endangered Species Act Before the Senate Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and 
Water of the Senate Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John 
D. Echeverria, Director, Environmental Policy Project, Georgetown University Law School), 2001 WL 
2007868. 
 506. 141 CONG. REC. H2459, H2470 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
 507. See Hearing on Endangered Species Act Before the Senate Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife 
and Water of the Senate Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of 
John D. Echeverria, Director, Environmental Policy Project, Georgetown University Law School), 2001 
WL 2007868 (criticizing proposal for extensive use of tax-payer funded incentive programs to comple-
ment or replace enforcement of the ESA). 
 508. See Tanya L. Godfrey, Note, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: A Hotly 
Contested Debate, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 979, 1018-20 (1996) (discussing compensation statutes). 
 509. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 265 (1st ed. 1827). 
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America failed in “reforming” the Act, it advanced this ideological ball 
considerably and the Executive Branch has picked up that ball and is run-
ning with it. 
Though purporting to protect private property rights and promote a 
smarter regulatory process, these actions advance a set of values that are in 
conflict with those that undergird the ESA. The legal regime they engender 
creates new entitlements, otherwise known as “incentives,” for private 
property owners who never held the right to harm wildlife without express 
permission from the sovereign as the public’s representative. 
This Article demonstrates that left unchecked, this rhetoric influences 
outcomes both formally and informally, whether through appropriations 
riders, regulations, or day-to-day discretionary agency actions. Moreover, 
its influence over the day-to-day activities of the agency is even more per-
nicious because policy erosion at this level, by its very nature, is difficult to 
document and challenge. Yet there is compelling evidence that the rhetoric 
is eroding the efficacy of the Endangered Species Act to the detriment of 
the imperiled species and the public. Indeed, rhetoric still matters. 
